Public transit and the public interest : an empirical evaluation of two administrative models by Frisken, Frances
 
 
Public Transit and the Public Interest: 
An Empirical Evaluation of Two 
Administrative Models 
 
 
 
Report No. 15 
__________________ 
by Frances Frisken 
1986 
__________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
The Institute of Urban Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FOR INFORMATION:  
 
The Institute of Urban Studies  
The University of Winnipeg 
599 Portage Avenue, Winnipeg  
phone: 204.982.1140  
fax: 204.943.4695  
general email: ius@uwinnipeg.ca  
 
Mailing Address:  
The Institute of Urban Studies  
The University of Winnipeg 
515 Portage Avenue  
Winnipeg, Manitoba, R3B 2E9  
 
 
PUBLIC TRANSIT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF TWO 
ADMINISTRATIVE MODELS 
Report No. 15 
Published 1986 by the Institute of Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg 
© THE INSTITUTE OF URBAN STUDIES 
 
Note: The cover page and this information page are new replacements, 2015.  
 
 
The Institute of Urban Studies is an independent research arm of the University of Winnipeg. Since 
1969, the IUS has been both an academic and an applied research centre, committed to examining 
urban development issues in a broad, non-partisan manner. The Institute examines inner city, 
environmental, Aboriginal and community development issues. In addition to its ongoing 
involvement in research, IUS brings in visiting scholars, hosts workshops, seminars and conferences, 
and acts in partnership with other organizations in the community to effect positive change. 
PUBLIC TRANSIT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: 
AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF TWO ADMINISTRATIVE MODELS 
Report No. 15 
by 
Frances Frisken 
Institute of Urban Studies 
1986 
CANADIAN CATALOGUING IN PUBLICATION DATA 
Frisken, Frances. 
Public transit and the public interest: an empirical evaluation of two 
administrative models 
(Report; no. 15) 
ISBN: 0-920213-09-x 
I. University of Winnipeg. Institute of Urban Studies. II. Title. 
III. Series: Reports (University of Winnipeg. Institute of Urban 
Studies); 15. 
This publication was partially supported by the Canada Mortgage and 
Housing Corporation, but the views expressed are the personal views of 
the author and the Corporation accepts no responsibility for them. 
Copyright 1986 
Insti~ute of Urban Studies ISBN: 0-920213-09-x 
- iii -
PREFACE 
The University of Winnipeg was the location of a major national 
urban studies conference, hosted by the Institute of Urban Studies 
in August 1985. The 11 Canadian Urban Studies Conference 11 addressed the 
general theme of 11 The Canadian Urban Experience- Past and Present. 11 
More than ninety specialists spoke during forty separate sessions on 
such topics as housing and the built environment, economic and community 
development, planning and urban form, women and the urban environment, 
and urban government and politics. 
This publication is a result of the Canadian Studies Conference. 
The Institute of Urban Studies is publishing many of the papers presented 
at the conference in the Institute's publication series. Some of the 
papers will also appear in the scholarly journal, the Urban History Review/ 
Revue d'histoire urbaine and in book form. 
This conference represented a major effort on the part of the Institute 
of Urban Studies in terms of fulfilling its role as a national centre 
of excellence in the urban studies and housing fields. 
Alan F.J. Artibise 
Director. 
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PUBLIC TRANSIT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: 
An Empirical Evaluation of Two Administrative Models* 
By 
Frances Frisken 
Two administrative models have long dominated discussions about the 
appropriate way to manage publicly-owned urban mass transit systems. 
One, the independent commission or public corporation model, rests on the 
principle that the public transit agency is in the business of producing a 
good for sale to those willing to pay the price. It calls for an 
organizational structure that permits the agency to operate as much as 
possible like any private firm, free to tailor its activities to market 
conditions within constraints conducive to management efficiency but 
without external interference - particularly interference from political 
bodies or from persons motivated by "political" considerations. The second 
model derives from a view of transit as a necessary public service that 
belongs, with other government services, under the immediate control of 
locally elected politicians who will ensure that its operations conform to 
government and community priorities. Each of these models contains 
implicit assumptions both about the nature of local politics and the 
implications of local government structure for the realization of objectives-
commonly associated with urban transit. This paper bases an examination 
of some of these assumptions on an extended case study of the transit 
system that has served the City of Toronto and its suburbs throughout this 
century. 
*The author extends thanks to the Social Science and Humanities Research 
Council and the University of Toronto - York University Joint Program in 
Transportation for the generous financial support that funded this research. 
She also conveys her appreciation to Beate Bowron, Joan Brown, Gwynneth 
Mclachlan and Christina White for their assistance with different phases o1 
the research. 
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Urban Transit and the Objectives of Local Government 
The debate about the merits of alternative approaches to urban public 
transit administration dates back to the early days of the urban street 
railway industry in North America, when it occurred in an atmosphere 
dominated by admiration for the achievements of the private sector and 
distrust of the motives and administrative capabilities of elected local 
governments. The issues seem no closer to resolution now than they were 
then, however, despite a marked trend toward public ownership and 
government subsidization that overtook local public transit companies in 
North America in the 1960s, and despite the fact that most urban 
governments are now highly professionalized. One recent study revealed 
substantial differences in the organizational structure and relationship to 
local government of 17 publicly-owned urban bus companies in the United 
States, an indication of substantial variation in the way city governments 
perceive the administrative requirements for effective transit operation.(!) 
On the basis of their analysis of these companies, authors Neil and Peter 
Hamilton propose a model for the "ideal" transit corporation that, they say, 
is more likely than alternative arrangements to satisfy the twin objectives 
of minimizing production costs while maintaining or expanding service 
mileage.(2) It is a model having many features in common with the "ideal" 
public corporation or independent commission favoured by turn-of-the 
century progressive reformers -features that include (i) an appointed 
policy-making board composed of persons with a background in business or 
public administration, some experience in community affairs and, ideally, 
some knowledge of transit operations, (i i) a competent planning and 
operating staff and (iii) a large measure of functional autonomy for the 
board and for the professionals who manage the system - to enable the 
board to interpret legislative policy in light of "dynamic conditions" and to 
enable management to translate generalized policy (as laid down either by 
the board or by outside governments) into clear and unconflicting 
performance measures or criteria (decision-making rules) for passenger 
mobility. 
In presenting their model the Hamiltons recognize a problem commonly 
attributed to the non-elected government organization: its lack of direct 
accountability to an electorate or its chosen representatives. They 
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maintain, however, that there are a number of ways in which a community 
(or its government) can ensure that an appointed board will act in its best 
interests: through the appointment process itself; by reviewing board 
decisions that involve the expenditure of tax dollars; by earmarking tax 
revenues for specific purposes; by submitting disputes to judicial review; 
or simply by taking steps to ensure the "competence and professionalism" cf 
board members and staff. They also emphasize the importance of 
maintaining pressure on management to meet its operating objectives at 
lowest possible cost. Such proposed safeguards of the "public interest" are 
unlikely to satisfy those who object to the use of criteria of productive 
efficiency as the principal way of assessing the performance of a transit 
agency. Such critics tend to regard the public corporation as a form of 
political organization whose dominance by persons imbued with business or 
bureaucratic norms renders it insensitive to the priorities of the larger 
community and indifferent to unmet transit needs. The only way to avoid 
such deficiencies, they suggest, is by selecting a structural arrangement 
that allows elected politicians or local citizens to participate directly in 
service decisions and the way those decisions are made. One way to do this 
is to entrust the operation of the transit system to a department of local 
government ultimately responsible to an elected city council. Another is to 
allow citizens to participate directly in transit decision-making. 
Two assumptions often implicit in discussions of alternative models 
of transit administration have received little critical examination in urban 
political analysis. The first is that the public corporation, once 
established, is indeed able to function independently from and with relative 
indifference to those currents of community opinion or community concern 
that find their way into local politics. The second is that the community 
concerns that do achieve effective expression in the political arena are 
those that will induce governments to adopt a transit policy that is more 
sensitive to the requirements of actual or potential transit users than is a 
policy devised by an agency that is formally isolated from the political 
arena. This second assumption derives from a theoretical perspective on 
urban politics that posits a direct relationship between actions taken by 
urban governments and the amount of influence exerted by (or influence 
potential of) various segments of the community having different stakes in 
policy outcomes. Such a perspective does not automatically mean that locai 
government decisions will benefit actual or potential transit users, 
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however, for there are certainly elements of any urban community whos~ 
interests do not coincide with those of persons who use or desire public 
transit and whose potential for influencing local government may be 
greater. There is in addition an alternative perspective on urban political 
behaviour that casts further doubt on the assumption that the decisions of 
an elected local government are likely to be more attuned to the needs of 
transit users than are those of an appointed body. It holds that the 
circumstances in which local governments find themselves are likely to 
have greater influence on their public service decisions than are the 
political activities or the relative political strength of community 
interests having a stake in those decisions. According to Paul Peterson, a 
leading exponent of this point of view, environmental circumstances 
typically impose severe constraints on what city governments can or will do 
to satisfy the varied and limitless demands emanating from their 
constituents. This is because a) local governments depend on taxes levied 
on local property and local businesses for a substantial proportion of their 
revenue and b) local municipalties must compete among themselves to 
attract the type of citizens and investors who are most likely to enhance 
local economies. Hence local governments are more likely to pursue policies 
that promise to bring their communities net economic benefits than policies 
that redistribute income from the better-off to the less-well-off members 
of the community - particularly if policies of the latter type imply 
disbenefits for local economies. They are likely to increase expenditures on 
redistributional policies, in fact, only after they have attended not only to 
those requirements most closely associated with the community's economic. 
well-being but also to those that "have neither much of a positive or much 
of a negative effect on the local economy." These intermediate policies, 
which Peterson calls "allocational", include the basic housekeeping services 
that allow the community to function and provide benefits to all its 
members, regardless of the size of their tax contribution. 
Peterson's argument leaves open the possibility of finding variations, 
both among different municipalities and within the same municipality at 
different points in time, in the degree to which the state of the local 
economy dominates the concerns of local councils and thus the policies they 
adopt. This is because there are circumstances that may produce a 
temporary relaxation of constraints on local governments and thus make 
them more responsive to demands for new or expanded services coming from 
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various sectors of the community, including those seeking expansion of 
services of a redistributive nature. Among such circumstances are I) a 
period of rapid economic growth and prosperity that yields a sudden 
increase in the size of the local tax base, a situation that allows local 
governments to increase spending without increasing taxes; 2) access to a 
new source of revenue, such as new or enlarged transfer payments from a 
more senior level of government or 3) the ascendancy to local elected 
office of a political party or collection of like-minded individuals who are 
committed for ideological or political reasons to expanding the local 
service sector and increasing locally-funded benefits to the less-affluent 
members of the community. Thus the thesis that emerges from an 
environmentally-based perspective on urban policy-making is that the way a 
local government behaves toward any particular service will vary according 
to a) the objectives it ascribes to that service and b) the circumstances in 
which the government finds itself at times when it is called upon to act. It 
is possible to test such a thesis by examining variations over time in local 
government responses to a single urban service associated with a variety of 
objectives, taking into account the circumstances in which those responses 
occur. 
Public transit is particularly well suited to such an examination 
because it is a service that can be located at various points on the spectrum 
of public policies ranging from the developmental to the redistributional, 
depending on the purpose ascribed to it. Its role as an aid to the 
development of cities was particularly apparent in the early years of the 
street railway industry, when the construction of lines leading from the 
center of cities into the surrounding countryside often accompanied or 
preceded the development of residential subdivisions.(4) It also served a 
broader spectrum of the urban population at that time than at any later 
period in its history because alternatives to its use were not only slow but 
often tiring and uncomfortable. With the advent of the automobile the role 
of transit as an agent of city growth and development declined in 
importance, and its role increasingly became one of providing a service to 
the community's more dependent members -those too poor, too young or too 
physically disabled to own or drive a car. Nonetheless it did have the 
advantage of transporting relatively large numbers of people in a relatively 
small amount of space, thereby helping to reduce congestion and 
road-building costs in heavily built-up areas. Recent years have seen a 
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revival of interest in the potential of urban transit - particularly rapid 
transit - either to stimulate a more compact, less wasteful pattern of urban 
development than the low density sprawl associated with automobiles or to 
foster the revitalization of decaying urban cores. 
· Peterson's analysis of urban policy-making dynamics suggests that 
urban governments will be more disposed to promote or assist urban transit 
at times when it holds promise of furthering economic development 
objectives than at times when its role is primarily one of providing 
mobility to the less productive members of the community. Only in periods 
of reduced constraint on policy-making initiative is an urban government 
likely to respond to demands for changes in transit service that benefit 
sectors of the community that are not associated in a positive way with the 
development or the stability of the local economy. Even then there is 
nothing to guarantee that the groups to which it responds will be those most 
in need of public transit. This perspective raises a number of questions 
that are not usually dealt with in discussions of alternative arrangements 
for urban public transit delivery. One has to do with the concerns that 
preoccupy a local government faced with the need to choose a model for 
administering the transit system. Which of the three objectives (aiding 
community development, providing benefits to local taxpayers, securing 
transportaton for those who most need it) does local government expect 
that model to fulfull, or to which of these objectives does it give priority? 
Other questions relate to the impacts that a change in circumstances may 
have on the attitudes of public officials toward urban transit and its mode 
of delivery. Can a change in circumstances bring about a change in or 
reordering of local government objectives for public transit? If such a 
change occurs, does it have any effect on the nature or performance of 
administrative arrangements in place at the time? If so, how do variations 
in administrative arrangements affect the realization of the different 
objectives commonly associated with public transit? Underlying all these 
questions is a more basic one. Is the administrative model that a city 
government selects for the operation of its public transit system likely to 
make any difference in the long run to the type or quality of the transit 
service its constituents receive? 
The system to which these questions are applied in this paper is 
currently owned by the Metropolitan Toronto government and operated by the 
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Toronto Transit Commission, an organization having many of the 
characteristics of the "ideal" public corporation promoted by the Hamiltons 
and the structural reformers who preceded them. A small part of that 
system has been publicly-owned and operated since 1910 and a larger part 
passed into the hands of the City of Toronto in 1921, at which time the city 
relinquished operating responsibility to an appointed commission of the 
type that has remained in control ever since. The system has been a 
singularly successful operation throughout its history, equalling or 
surpassing virtually all other North American transit systems for most 
criteria commonly used to measure both the quality and efficiency of a 
transit operation. Nonetheless it has faced periodic attacks from political 
activists seeking to bring it under the direct control of an elected council or 
to make it more responsive to one segment of the community or another. 
These occasions provide opportunities to assess the way circumstances can 
influence the political pressures brought to bear on such an agency as well 
as the impact of those pressures on the character of the agency, on the role 
of local government in transit delivery and on the way the transit system 
evolves. 
The Decision for Public Ownership in Toronto 
The City of Toronto's 1919 decision to buy out its privately-owned 
public transportation system has been depicted as the act of a city 
government more committed than most to protect the interests of its 
citizens from the greed and indifference of a profit hungry private 
corporation. (5) It is equally tenable, however, to view the move to public 
ownership as the act of a government that had gone so far in trying to use a 
private supplier to serve the city's interests that it left itself no 
alternative but to find another arrangement. The contract that City Council 
signed with the privately-owned Toronto Railway Company in 1891 
incorporated concessions to a variety of interests that were pressing their 
demands on government at the time.(6) It recognized the concerns of the 
growing labour movement (of which street railway workers had been 
particularly active in Toronto) by specifying a minimum wage and maximum 
hours of work and by tempering its provision for a five-cent fare with a 
requirement for reduced-priced tickets (at 8 for 25¢) for use during mornin9 
and evening rush hours. It also provided for the free transportation of 
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uniformed city police and firemen. It held out the promise of new jobs by 
committing the company to the construction of a factory within the city for 
the manufacture and repair of streetcars and other equipment. It 
acknowledged growing pressure on city governments to exercise strict and 
technically competent supervision of private utility companies by assigning 
the City Engineer broad powers to decide where the company should build its 
lines, the type of equipment it should use and the amount of service it 
should provide. Its most detailed and comprehensive provisions, however, 
were those that specified the company's financial obligations to the city. 
Not only did those provisions ensure that the city would bear none of the 
costs of constructing and repairing the lines (which were to undergo 
conversion to electricity) - including costs incurred during a brief period of 
city ownership in 1891 - but they also required the company to pay the city 
$800 per mile of track to reimburse it for the cost of paving streets used by 
the railway; an annual share of gross receipts according to a graduated 
scale that rose to a maximum of 20o/o on receipts over $3,000,000 (the 
highest percentage levied on any street railway company in North America) 
and the prevailing city tax for public school purposes. 
The 1891 contract made it clear, then, that Toronto's government felt 
no obligation to contribute toward the cost of providing transportation at a 
time when the city's outward growth was making it a necessary service for 
a growing number of citizens. Instead it treated the transportation system 
as a source of revenue for city purposes. Furthermore it made no provision 
for adjusting the financial arrangements to changes in conditions governing 
ridership and profitablity. Such changes are not only linked to changes in 
the cost of living but also to the pattern of city growth, for as a city 
expands and transportation routes extend outward, ridership per mile tends 
to decrease (because of lower suburban densities) while costs increase 
(because of the longer distances that vehicles must travel to serve a given 
number of riders). The city's failure ever to acknowledge the implications 
of urban expansion for transit costs and revenues was an important factor 
in the dispute that ultimately led it to take over the system. 
Serious disagreement between the city government and its street 
railway operators broke out soon after the turn of the century when the city 
embarked on a succession of annexations that would almost double its size 
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by 1921. The company had already indicated that it did not intend to extend 
its lines beyond the City's 1891 boundaries and was responding to suburban 
expansion by setting up subsidiary companies to operate electric radial 
lines between the city limits and outlying communities. City Council 
refused to accede to company requests for permission to connect these lines 
with street railway termini inside the city, apparently because the company 
was unwilling to agree to terms and conditions sought by the city 
government on the advice of an outside consultant and its own Property 
Commissioner.(?) It tried instead to compel the company to extend city 
lines into the newly annexed districts under the terms of the 1891 franchise. 
The company insisted it was under no legal ob1igation to do so, a position 
upheld by the London Privy Council in a 1910 decision, and Council 
immediately authorized its Department of Works to build street railway 
lines in the newly-annexed districts.(8) For the next decade, then, the 
government and citizens of Toronto experienced the operation of a public 
transit system under an administrative arrangement that gave Council a 
deciding voice in its mode of operation. 
Choosing an Administrative Model 
The decision to build and operate the civic lines essentially ended the 
debate about public versus private ownership in Toronto. It was followed by 
ten years of discussions about the way the city should finance and operate 
its public transit system after it had exercised its contractual right to buy 
out the private company when its franchise expired in 1921. Those 
discussions occupied two distinct periods, the first lasting until the 
outbreak of World War I and a change in city government at the end of 1914; 
the second from then until Council actually voted in 1918 to purchase the 
railway and entrust its operation to an appointed commission. During the 
first period they focussed on an abortive attempt by the city's reform 
mayor, Horatio Hocken, to negotiate an immediate purchase of the private 
company, and were principally concerned with the financial implications of 
such a move. During the second period, discussions of the financial 
implications of takeover were closely intertwined with discussions about 
the best way to operate the system once it was in city hands. 
- 10 -
The first round of discussions provided Council with a choice of three 
alternative ways of financing the consolidation and expansion of its street 
railway system. One was to pay the full costs out of revenues on the lines, 
something that consultants suggested the city could accomplish if it applied 
the TRC fare schedule on a uniform basis throughout the city and if it were 
willing to forego some of the profits it was then receiving from the 
enterprise.(9) A second proposal was that put forward by S. Morley Wickett, 
an academic writer on municipal reform who served as city alderman from 
1913 to 1915 and chaired a Special Committee on Transportation set up by 
City Council. Wickett cited increased property values associated with the 
construction of the New York subway as a reason for charging all or part of 
the costs of new transit lines to property owners who benefitted from their 
construction.(1 0) Such an approach would be more equitable, he argued, than 
placing the burden on the general taxpayer. This view was at variance with 
that espoused by Mayor Hocken, who considered improved suburban transit 
as a necessary element of a program of social reform that would allow 
workingmen to move out of the crowded central districts into less 
congested areas on the periphery. Even as it was, Hocken maintained, the 
burden of paying two fares was falling increasingly on working-class people 
who constituted a growing proportion of residents in outlying districts. (11) 
His position was a defense of a third alternative -that of financing part of 
the cost of transportation improvements out of city tax revenues. This was 
the course actually followed during Hocken's mayoralty, for Council ignored 
the advice of its Commissioner of Works and set a rate of fare on the civic 
lines that was too low to cover their costs. It rejected Wickett's proposal 
for a special assessment on property-owners who stood to benefit directly 
from new lines. On three different occasions it also turned down motions 
to establish either an elected or appointed Commission to take over the 
city's transportation services.(12) 
City Council's consideration of financial alternatives took place 
toward the end of a period of remarkable growth in the national economy 
that fuelled rapid increases in the city's population and assessment base. 
Between 1900 and 1913 the city's population grew by 124°/o; its assessment 
by 249o/o. ((13) It was also a period of rapid territorial expansion. Between 
1909 and 1914 alone the city annexed over 8000 acres of suburban territory -
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more than four-fifths the total amount annexed between 1891 and 1921 and 
two-fifths of the city's total area in 1921. (14) At least some of this 
activity occurred because suburban areas and their governments (North 
Toronto being an example) sought annexation to the city as a way of 
securing better transportation and other public services. In achieving their 
goal such areas immediately became a source of pressure on the city to 
provide those services.(15) 
It was a period when the city government was particularly ready to 
respond to demands for new services. Not only did the council and 
ratepayers agree to the establishment of a municipal hydro-electric 
system, the initiation of civic street railway lines and major improvements 
to the city's roads, sewage treatment facilities and waterworks, but 
Council also adopted those measures that Mayor Hocken would later 
attribute to "the new spirit in municipal government" - measures that 
included expanded commitments to social and community services, the 
construction of a municipal abattoir as a way of regulating the price of 
meat and the institution of a minimum wage for city employees.(16) It was 
a period, in other words, when the city government seemed unusually 
disposed toward spreading the benefits of prosperity among all branches of 
the citizenry. What is especially noteworthy is that all this activity placed 
no additional burden on city taxpayers. The mill rate actually declined 
between 1900 and 1911, in fact, and then rose only slightly for the next three 
years.(17) From all indications, the ratepayers could have their cake and 
eat it too. 
The same period was also one of remarkable financial prosperity for 
the Toronto Railway Company. Between 1903 and 1913 ridership almost 
trebled, from 53 to 151 million, and gross income rose from $2 to $6 million. 
(18) These increases brought immediate financial benefits to the city in 
the form of a steady growth in annual percentage payments and the City 
Treasurer regularly reminded Council of this fact in his annual reports. The 
Company was doing well out of its investment nonetheless - paying a 
dividend of 8o/o out of its profits by 1910 and still realizing a healthy 
surplus, some of which it spent on improvements to the system but most of 
which it allowed to accumulate in a reserve account -especially after the 
city government became more fixed in its determination to purchase the 
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system as soon as or even before its franchise expired. Thus there seemed 
no reason to doubt that the city was planning to take over a financially 
viable operation. Nonetheless there were enough obstacles in the way of 
early purchase to prolong negotiations until the outbreak of World War I, at 
which time the city government abandoned the attempt.(19) ~Hocken stepped 
down as mayor and voters replaced him with T.L. Church, a former controller 
who had opposed Hocken's negotiations with the company. Church was a 
friend and admirer of Adam Beck, the ambitious and aggressive chairman of 
the publicly-owned Ontario Hydro-Electric Power Company and an 
implacable foe of the private consortium that owned the TRC, its subsidary 
radial companies and several private power companies with which Ontario 
Hydro was competing. It was Beck's contention that the railway would be 
virtually worthless by the time its franchise expired and thus much cheaper 
to acquire than while it was still a "going concern." (20) 
Beck's was not the only pressure on Council to exercise caution in its 
financial commitments. By 1914 the city's circumstances were beginning to 
look quite different from those that had prevailed when the purchase 
negotiations began. Rapid economic growth had ended in 1913 and the city 
government not only had to deal with a growing number of unemployed (for 
whom it constituted the only source of relief) but also with an atmosphere 
of distrust among international financiers about the worth of Canadian 
government securities.(21) In Ontario some of that distrust focussed on 
the provincially and municipally-owned electric power companies that had 
always been under attack from both national and foreign defenders of 
private enterprise.(22) Church's election thus coincided with the beginning 
of a period of growing pressure on the city to constrain its spending and 
avoid commitment to new and costly undertakings. Nonetheless he began his 
first term of office by stating his opposition both to an increase in fares on 
the civic lines and to the formation of a transportation commission, saying 
that the Commissioner of Works was administering the lines with 
efficiency and economy.(23) Only one year later, however, he was calling on 
Council to appoint a six-man Transportation Commission to "deal with the 
whole transportation problem of Greater Toronto for all time ... "(24) For the 
time being Council was ready to appoint an advisory commission only, and 
for the next three years the interested parties debated the composition of a 
permanent body. The Advisory Transportation Commission favoured a 
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six-man board consisting of the Mayor, the City's Commissioner of Finance, 
two representatives from the business community, one from Labor, and one 
from the Toronto Electric Commission. Council wanted a five-man board 
consisting of the Commissioner of Finance and four appointees of its own 
choice. The Board of Control advocated a commission composed of three 
ratepayers - a model that promised greatest flexibility but also least 
possibility for Council influence or interference: The Board of Control 
prevailed, and in 1919 Council agreed to ask the city's electors to approve 
turning over the city's transportatjon system to "three ratepayers resident 
in the Municipality to be appointed by the City Council and to act without 
salary." (26) 
The Purpose of the Model 
Just what, though, was the transportation problem that the mayor 
expected the city's new commission to solve "for all time?" There were 
actually three distinct problems that had surfaced repeatedly during the 
acrimonious debates that characterized Toronto's transit politics after 
1900, any one of which might have priority in the minds of those who 
supported the move to public ownership and management by independent 
commission. The first was the refusal of the private company to adjust 
its services to accommodate or anticipate the growth of the city. The 
authors of one study of the city's transportation requirements saw that as 
the key problem, noting that any extension of the transportation system 
should precede population expansion, whereas in Toronto it had been the 
reverse. "Any policy which results in such reversal," they wrote, "will fail 
to develop the resources of the city to the fullest extent."(27) By this time, 
however, city officials were changing their minds about the need to pin 
their hopes for the city's economic future on the extension of the local 
transportation system or the enlargement of the city itself. Instead they 
were expecting the benefits of growth to flow from a system of radial 
railways being promoted by Hydro Chairman Adam Beck- a scheme that 
Council and local ratepayers approved in 1915. It was the mayor's opinion 
that the radials would make Toronto "the hub of the Province", would help 
reduce the high cost of living by providing cheaper transportation for food 
and coal, would provide employment after the war and would help solve the 
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problem of under-production.(28) He was also pushing for better roads 
between Toronto and nearby communities. The city government decided 
during the same period not to annex any more territory unless the owners 
agreed to pay the entire cost of bringing services up to city standards. The 
city was willing to pay its share of the radials, in other words, but it 
wanted its contribution to the region's development to end there. 
A second problem that loomed large in discussions of the city's 
transportation needs and difficulties was that of poor or deteriorating 
service. Under Church's leadership Toronto politicians became increasingly 
vigorous in their attempts to pressure the company to make improvements 
in its service and equipment. In doing so they often had the backing of the 
Ontario Railway and Municipal Board, a provincial regulatory agency 
established in 1906 to oversee relations between municipalities and private 
utility companies. Nevertheless the city was not prepared to give service 
improvements priority over all other considerations. In 1915, for example, a 
contingent of city officials led by Mayor Church celebrated the expiry of one 
of the TRC radial franchises by tearing up a section of the line, leaving the 
unfortunate citizens of North Toronto worse off with respect to 
transportation than they had been before. (29) That same year the council 
decided not to grant franchises to private bus companies that wanted to do 
business in the city. It also began to regulate privately-owned jitneys so 
severely that they ceased operation, even though both types of carrier would 
have provided an alternative to the service offered by the much maligned 
street railway company.(30) Quality of service took second place to the 
city's concern with protecting the monopoly rights and thus the financial 
viability of the local system. 
There is nothing to indicate, however, that Toronto citizens were 
dissatisfied with the way their government handled transportation issues 
throughout the entire period of assessment and review, despite the apparent 
inconsistencies and reversals in city policy. Between 1910 and 1920 Council 
went five times to the city's electors and six times to its ratepayers for 
approval of measures that implied ever-greater city commitment to the 
acquisition, financing or operation of street and radial electric railways. It 
failed to gain that approval only once - when it asked electors in 1912 to 
authorize City Council to spend over $5,000,000 on an underground street_ 
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railway. In two referenda held in 1920, the electors both approved the 
operation of the Toronto railway by a three-man Commission and agreed 
that the city could apply for legislative authority to borrow for the railway 
without first asking the ratepayers for approval.(31) The margin of 
approval was virtually the same (just under 5 to I) for both votes. Evidently 
the electors did not approve the Commission model as a way of indicating 
dissatisfaction with Council's handling of transportation issues. Nor had 
there been any indication that members of the city government questioned 
the ability or competence of the Works Commissioner and his staff to 
manage and operate a street railway, or that there were aldermen who saw 
the city's direct involvement in the street railway business as an 
opportunity for their personal enrichment. Aldermen did keep up continuous 
pressure on the Works Department to build new lines in their own wards, 
however, and the Department occasionally turned these down on the ground 
that the areas were already adequately served or not yet developed enough 
to support a service - reasons very like those used by the TRC in similar 
circumstances. 
A more frequent source of disagreement between City Council and its 
Department of Works was Council's repeated refusal to authorize any 
increase in fares on the civic lines, even though they consistently lost 
money. The Commissioner's regular request for fare increases was a 
recurring reminder of a third problem associated with the operation of a 
street railway: that of maintaining it on a sound financial basis. It was the 
Commissioner's contention that fares on the civic lines should be high 
enough to make the system self-supporting, for otherwise "ratepayers were 
being made to pay for a service that benefitted only a section of the 
community" and the losses experienced by the lines provided ammunition for 
opponents of public ownership.(32) Council members were under continuous 
pressure to keep fares low, however- especially from those residents who 
had to pay at least two fares to get downtown. The costs of responding to 
that pressure were not critical as long as the TRC remained profitable and 
the city could count on receiving a substantial share of street railway 
earnings, for the city's receipts from TRC percentage and pavement taxes 
were more than enough to cover both the cost of maintaining street railway 
streets and the deficit on the civic lines. As time for takeover approached, 
however, there were indications that the city could not rely on the TRC lines 
to remain profitable indefinitely at the existing rate of fare. Annual profits 
- 16 -
on the private lines began to fall after 1913 (even though gross receipts 
continued to rise) as a result of rising operating costs. In 1918 the company 
applied to the city and the ORMB for permission to raise fares. Both bodies 
turned down the request, citing the company's failure to make requested 
improvements.(33) Nonetheless the application itself conveyed a message 
to the system's future owners. 
The declining financial fortunes of both the civic and the TRC lines 
paralleled a more general decline in the city's financial situation. Although 
the demands of a war enconomy had eased the depression after 1915, it also 
produced a rapid inflation that increased the costs of all city services at a 
time of slowdown in the growth of the city's population and assessment. As 
the mill rate rose from 19.25 in 1914 to 30.5 in 1919 city officials became 
more insistent on the need to find ways to economize. One way was to 
ensure that publicly-owned utilities would pay for themselves. This was 
the objective that dominated the city's perception of its transportation 
"problem" by the time it decided how it would administer the city system. 
In drawing up the terms of its agreement with the Toronto Transportation 
Commission, the City Council adopted what its Advisory Transportation 
Commission had recommended as the underlying principle of such an 
operation: that of providing "an adequate and efficient service, and that only 
such rates of fares shall be charged as will secure this, and will, at the 
same time, make the system self-sustaining - including the maintenance of 
the property in good condition, and due provision for renewals, depreciation, 
and debt charges."{34) 
Not everyone on Council was committed to the administrative model 
the majority had chosen, of course, nor was it clear for a time whether 
Council would continue to support that model once its financial implications 
became clear. The first skirmish between the city and its newly-created 
transit authority occurred even before Council had transferred TRC assets 
to the TIC to operate, when the TIC's newly-appointed General Manager H.H. 
Couzens announced that fares on the consolidated system would be 7¢ a ride 
(or 4 tickets for 25¢) with free transfers between lines but with no 
reduced-price tickets during morning and evening rush hours. After 
outlining the challenges faCing the Commission, Couzens told the Board of 
Control that "The object which the Commission is striving to maintain is to 
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give a more adequate service at the lowest possible cost, and not the least 
possible service at a fixed price." Council members fought the increase but 
finally approved the transfer by a narrow margin. Mayor Church, who had 
vowed to turn the system over to the Department of Works if the TIC did not 
back down, was absent from the meeting when the vote was taken.(35) 
Apart from clearly specifying the TTC's obligation to make the city 
transit system self-sustaining, the agreement the city signed with the 
Commission in 1921 gave the transit agency a great deal of latitude to 
decide all details of operation - routes, schedules, type of equipment and 
rate of expansion and improvement - and thus a degree of freedom and 
flexibility that the city had always denied the Toronto Railway Company. 
The only checks the city retained over the Commission's activities were 
powers to appoint its members and to review the company's books on an 
annual basis. Two other city decisions gave the Commission additional 
advantages denied the private company. One was the decision to refrain 
from further annexation, a reversal of earlier policy that relieved the TIC 
from the type of pressure exerted on the TRC to expand services in 
anticipation of future development and future ridership. The second was a 
decision to free the TTC from all forms of taxation except that levied on 
city property-owners for school purposes - a concession criticized by the 
city finance commissioner as an indirect taxpayer subsidy to the streetcar 
system.(37) On the other hand the TIC faced a challenge not present in the 
context in which the TRC had begun to operate -the increasing use of 
automobilies and other automotive forms of travel, and the competitive 
threat these posed to street railways- both intra- and inter-city. 
The TTC Under City Ownership 
The events leading to public takeover and the terms of the TTC 
agreement both indicated that the city government's principal aim in 
moving from the council-committee to the public corporation model for 
public transit administration was that of protecting the city's investment 
and ensuring that city taxpayers did not have to pay any of the system's 
capital and operating costs. There had been enough agitation about service 
issues and enough debate about administrative alternatives, however, to 
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indicate that the TTC could succeed politically where the TRC had failed 
only if it managed to achieve a balance between the conflicting demands for 
better service and fiscal self-sufficiency. The strategy the TTC adopted to 
achieve that balance had many features in common with that of its 
unpopular predecessor.(38) With the help of capital borrowed by the city on 
its behalf the Commission embarked immediately on a comprehensive 
program of renovation and improvements, just as the TRC had done in the 
early years of its contract. It replaced outworn track and equipment 
belonging to the city system and consolidated and integrated TRC with civic 
lines and both with sections of radial lines located within the city limits. 
(The city had acquired those lines in a massive "clean-up" deal that 
transferred all privately-owned electric utilities to the city in 1922) . At 
the same time it based its service decisions primarily on cost/revenue 
criteria. It cut out trolley buses when it found them uneconomic to operate 
and moved as quickly as possible to replace two-man with one-man cars as 
a way of reducing operating costs. It refused to provide new routes or 
extend existing ones to areas where development had not advanced far 
enough to provide enough passengers to cover the additional costs. It 
relaxed this rule only for areas whose residents were particularly 
disadvantaged in terms of walking distance to nearest available service, 
with 2200 feet being the maximum distance used to justify decisions based 
on economic criteria alone. 
Needless to say the TTC's method of fulfilling its mandate left some 
members of the community dissatisfied and exposed the agency to 
criticisms from several sources. The Commission had to defend its move to 
one-man streetcar operation to the Ontario Railway and Municipal Board, 
local politicians and even the provincial legislature, for example, against 
attacks from union representatives concerned about loss of jobs and 
citizens who considered one-man operation unsafe.(39) Persons or areas 
dissatisfied with the pace of improvements or the TIC's response to 
requests for service conveyed that dissatisfaction to their aldermen, who 
raised the matter in Council. The TTC's reconstruction and improvement 
program drew complaints from persons inconvenienced by the disruption to 
local streets. There were frequent demands that the TTC lower its fares. 
As it became clear that the TTC was managing not only to cover both its 
capital and operating costs but also build up a reserve fund against future 
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"contingencies", there were also growing demands that it return some of its 
earnings to the city in the form of additional taxes or contributions to the 
cost of street paving. 
It was clear from early in the TIC's history, then, that the 
administrative model the city had selected for its transit system had not 
freed the system or its operators from involvement in the political arena. 
To counteract adverse criticism, the Commission issued reports and placed 
advertisements in local newspapers to publicize its progress in making 
improvements to the system. It answered aldermanic requests for new or 
expanded service with regular reports giving detailed reasons either for its 
refusal or its compliance with those requests. It periodically reminded City 
Council that it too had a responsibility for the quality and extent of the 
city's transit services, for the city had to provide streets before the TTC 
could lay tracks or institute bus routes. It met all demands for reduced 
fares or for transfer of funds to city coffers with reminders of the need to 
maintain adequate funds on reserve both to pay off the city's debt and keep 
the system in good condition. These strategies were effective until the 
late 1920s, when dissatisfaction with TIC activities rose to such a level 
that the city government found it necessary to intervene directly in TTC 
affairs. 
The events that prompted the city's intervention occurred during a 
period of rapid economic recovery that followed the post-World War I 
depression. Beginning in 1927 the city experienced a sudden spate of new 
downtown development and a rapid rise in assessment. The city's mayors 
were advising council nonetheless to refrain from committing the 
government to any major new investments.(40) The city still had a large 
debt, they pointed out, and it was advisable to keep taxes low to keep the 
city attractive to new investors. During this same period the TTC 
experienced a sudden increase in ridership, unusual for the industry at that 
time, and soon became the target of complaints about overcrowding and 
lack of sufficient vehicles during rush hours. It was in this context of 
conflicting pressures for frugality and service expansion that a dispute 
broke out between the TIC board - now reduced to one member by the death 
and illness of two original commissioners - and its General Manager, D.W. 
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Harvey. The ostensible matter of disagreement was the choice of supplier 
of11 0 new streetcars but its underlying cause was a fundamental 
difference of opinion between the two men about the state and future of the 
mass transit industry and the scope of TTC responsibilities.(41) The one 
active commissioner, E.W. Lennox, had approved the streetcar purchase over 
Harvey's recommendation, citing the Commission's responsibility to respond 
to complaints about inadequate service. Lennox associated increased 
ridership with the city's recent growth and prosperity, which he insisted 
the TIC had a duty to accommodate and help sustain by expanding its 
services in the city and extending them to the suburbs. His motives for 
taking that position were not entirely disinterested, for as a person who 
described himself as having been "intimately associated with the building 
construction for many years" he had his own reasons for encouraging an 
expansionist policy. Harvey maintained that the Commission should refrain 
from major new capital investments at a time when the future of the 
transit industry was uncertain. He backed up his argument with statistics 
that documented an overall decline in patronage in the rest of North America 
as a result of the increased use of automobiles. His data also showed TTC 
service to be better than that provided by most other North American 
transit companies and to have improved steadily since the agency's 
formation. The city could help alleviate delays and overcrowding on the 
streetcars, he insisted, if it adopted stricter measures to control the 
movement of traffic and parking on downtown streets. 
The disunity within the Commission provided City Council with an 
opportunity to use its power of appointment to make the agency more 
responsive to expansionist demands. What Council did instead was appoint 
as acting commissioners the city's present and former Commissioners of 
Finance - the two men most likely to agree with Harvey's cautious approach 
to new expenditures. Those individuals decided not to approve the 
streetcar purchase, prompting an angry public response from Lennox that 
they chose to interpret as an attack on the motives and integrity of the 
General Manager and other members of the Commission (including 
themselves). On their advice Council initiated a full judicial inquiry into 
TIC affairs, asking York Country Judge J.H. Denton to consider both the 
streetcar question and a second matter that had been the subject of 
political controversy over the preceding two years: the TTC's 1927 decision 
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to use $1,000,000 of its reserve funds to establish an independent 
subsidiary, Gray Coach Lines Ltd., to operate inter-urban bus services out of 
Toronto. 
Gray Coach Lines Ltd. was one of two ways the TIC had chosen to 
respond to the demand for transportation service to communities outside 
the city, including nearby suburbs. {The other was to extend local streetcar 
and bus services into the suburbs on a cost-of-service basis, with deficits 
charged to the governments of benefitting municipalities.) The enterprise 
traced its origins to a TIC decision to buy up and operate private bus 
companies that were competing with several radial lines the city had 
acquired from private power interests and turned over to the TTC to 
operate, on the understanding that the city would pay any. deficits. The city 
had taken over the lines just as they were beginning to experience the 
financial reversals that beset the inter-urban electric railway industry 
after the advent of automotive competition. The TIC soon instituted a 
policy of phasing out the lines, therefore, and substituting Gray Coach 
service to affected communities. It always maintained that this policy 
was in the best interests of the city, for it meant reptacing a money-losing 
investment with an enterprise better attuned to emerging transportation 
demand. Its action aroused considerable opposition nonetheless, both from 
municipalities outside Toronto, which objected to the loss of the radials or 
the threat posed to their own economies by Toronto's greater accessibility, 
and by ratepayers, civic officials and civic groups that maintained the TTC 
had no right to invest in new enterprises (or large capital undertakings of 
any kind) without Council and ratepayer approval. According to their 
particular stake in the transit system, these critics maintained that the 
TIC should use its surplus to lower fares, increase wages, retire its debt to 
the city more quickly or improve service. 
The dispute erupted during the summer of 1929, a period when the city 
was still experiencing the effects of prosperity and rapid growth . By the 
time the inquiry got underway the Depression had begun and by the time it 
ended, in March 1930, the prospects facing both the city and the TTC had 
changed considerably. Already the TTC had begun to experience the decline 
in patronage that was to cut its ridership by twenty-five percent over the 
next four years. The only bright spot in the picture was Gray Coach Lines, 
which actually experienced an increase in passengers and receipts while 
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those of the city lines were declining. The city government's reaction to the 
judicial inquiry and its outcome was undoubtedly influenced as much by 
these developments as by the recommendations that came out of it. In his 
report to Council Judge Denton essentially cleared the TTC of all charges of 
corruption and mismanagement but questioned the appropriateness of the 
TIC's Gray Coach venture. At the same time he maintained that the 
Commission's financial position made it well able to make improvements to 
the local system. He advised the city to strengthen the commission by 
giving it younger and more vigorous members and by paying them for their 
service (something the city had always refused to do). It should also 
exercise more detailed supervision over the TTC's financial affairs, he said. 
The city government's response was to allow the TTC to keep Gray Coach but 
to restrain it from enlarging that enterprise without Council approval; to 
decide not to increase its financial supervision over TTC affairs after 
hearing how much a more detailed audit would cost; to allow the TTC to 
continue to put surplus earnings in the much-criticized reserve accounts 
(which were now helping to offset revenue losses) and to leave all decisions 
about service changes and improvements in the hands of a 
newly-constituted Commission whose members would be paid for the first 
time. In selecting members for that Commission Council rejected those 
candidates who had been directly involved in the recent controversies about 
TTC activities but it did provide for the representation of a somewhat 
broader range of community interests than were found on the original 
Commission. One of the new members was a representative of organized 
labour, the second was a former financial officer of the Toronto Railway 
Company, and the third, William McBrien, was superintendant of the real 
estate department of a Toronto trust company and a person active in civic 
affairs.(42) 
McBrien, who soon became TTC chairman and held that position until 
his death in 1954, would later receive much of the credit for the 
subsequent harmony that characterized the TTC's internal affairs and the 
lack of political controversy about transit issues that prevailed in Toronto 
over the next two decades. The appointment of a new and stronger 
Commission was only one of three council decisions taken at this time with 
important implications for transit operation, however. The second was a 
decision not to implement much of an ambitious and costly plan for street 
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improvements presented to Council in 1930 by an Advisory City Planning 
Committee charged with finding ways to relieve traffic congestion and 
improve the appearance of the downtown.(43) The Committee's plan 
emphasized measures to adapt Toronto's street system to the increase in 
automobile traffic that was likely to accompany the growth of the region to 
a projected population of 1.5 million people. By removing streetcar lines 
from some streets and making it easier for commuters to travel downtown 
by automobile, its implementation would have made it more difficult for the 
TIC to continue as the principal form of transportation for persons 
travelling into the city. The third significant decision was a negative 
response to applications from the suburban municipalities of York and East 
York for annexation to the city- a decision that essentially reaffirmed the 
city's 1918 policy against further expansion through annexation.(44) The 
proposed annexations, which the TTC and several city officials advised 
council not to approve, would undoubtedly have led to immediate pressure 
for the TIC to include the new territory in the uniform fare system. Their 
rejection left the Commission free for the next twenty years to concentrate 
on improving the system it had consolidated in 1921. 
The changes made in the Commission in 1930 resulted in little change 
in the way the TTC carried out its duties. Immediately after the Denton 
inquiry the Commission launched a campaign to improve its public relations 
by issuing a number of reports lauding its past achievements~ It also added 
those few services necessary to allow it to claim that it had brought 
transit service to within 2000 feet of 99.5°/o of the city's population. 
Beyond that it responded to the depression by economizing even more 
strictly than it had in the earlier period. Throughout the 1930s it also 
managed to deflect pressures on council to tap TIC surplus revenues for 
various city purposes by reminding elected officials of the Commission's 
responsibilities to keep the property in good repair (and thus protect the 
city's investment) and to ensure financial solvency in the event of a further 
downturn in the economy. It also pointed out the political dangers of a fare 
increase for which aldermen might be held responsible. The success of 
these arguments enabled it to make substantial improvements and 
replacements to its streetcar fleet in the latter part of the decade. 
The TTC's protective strategy worked less well after 1940 when a 
large wartime increase in ridership produced a rapid rise in revenues just at 
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a time when the city had to expand its own services to accommodate a 
population swelled by af1 influx of war workers. Under pressure from the 
Board of Trade the City forced the TTC in 1942 to supplement the tax it paid 
on land with a tax on its buildings and a business tax. These additional 
taxes, together with other charges levied on the TTC, meant that the 
Commission was paying a higher level of local taxation than private 
businesses. ( 45) City Council added to those costs still further in 1944 by 
having the Ontario Legislature make the TIC responsible for operating 
losses on an uneconomic ferry service to nearby Toronto Island - a service 
the TTC had taken over in 1927 on condition that the city would pay all 
deficits.(46) As an alternative to lowering its fares the Commission also 
agreed in 1943 to spend $750,000 of its surplus revenues on a program of 
public works to improve the movement of traffic on streets used by its 
vehicles. (47) 
Meeting the Challenges of Congestion and Suburban Expansion 
The TTC's decision to finance street improvements out of its own 
revenues attested to the failure of its long-standing efforts to persuade the 
city government to adopt parking and traffic control measures as a way of 
aiding the movement of transit vehicles. While the city had been loathe to 
adopt measures that would curtail the freedom of private vehicles, it had 
also refrained throughout the 1930s from making any significant 
expenditures on street improvements. Thus the war years found the TTC 
stepping up its efforts to persuade City Council to take action to reduce 
growing congestion on the city's narrow streets. After an unsuccessful 
attempt to have the city adopt a plan that would allow the TTC to put two 
north-south streetcar lines on private rights-of way the Commission began 
to promote the idea of placing two of its busiest lines, on Yonge and Queen 
Streets, underground. The result of its efforts was the city's 1946 decision 
to allow the TTC to proceed with construction of a subway under Yonge 
Street. 
The Yonge Street subway proposal was consistent with the TTC's 
conservative operating philosophy-> for by the end of the war ridership on 
the Yonge streetcar line exceeded the maximum capacity normally assigned 
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to such facilities. It also took account of the rapid development occurring 
just outside the City's northern boundaries and the additional pressure this 
was likely to place on existing transportation facilities. These were not 
the main arguments the TTC used in its successful campaign to persuade the 
city's newly-created Advisory City Planning Commission, business 
community, elected officials and voters to agree to the project, however. 
Instead that campaign emphasized the advantages of removing streetcars 
from congested city streets and the economic benefits that an improved 
transit system would bring to the city in the form of higher downtown 
property values, new jobs and increased potential for "the development of 
Toronto as a major industrial center."(48) The operating surplus of 
$25,000,000 that the TTC had accrued by the end of the war, together with 
the prospect of financial assistance from federal government 
reconstruction funds, also enabled it to assure city council and the city 
electorate that they could have the subway for no greater financial outlay 
than that needed to replace or improve affected city services. 
Inner city congestion was not the only transportation problem 
receiving attention from Toronto area decision-makers in the years right 
after the war. The second was the build-up of pressure for better 
transportation between the city and its rapidly-growing suburbs. A 
perceived need for better roads to aid the area's development was the issue 
that converted Frederick G. Gardiner, reeve of the suburban municipality of 
Forest Hill and future chairman of Metropolitan Toronto, from a position of 
opposing to one of supporting the unification of the area's municipalities 
under a single government. (49) Public transit was also a matter of 
areawide concern. By 1947 there were four independent bus lines 
supplementing the TIC's suburban services and 14 different fares being 
charged to suburban residents travelling into Toronto (50). When 
consultants of suburban municipalities met in 1947 with a 
recently-constituted Toronto and York Planning Board to discuss the 
contents of a proposed metropolitan plan, they identified public transit 
unification as one of the two matters most urgently needing attention. (The 
second was drainage and water supply.) (51) 
The man chosen to advise the Toronto and York Planning Board on 
transportation matters was Norman D. Wilson, a self-employed consulting 
engineer who had worked on several studies of the city's transportation 
problems and had been one of the principal architects and most vigorous 
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proponents of the TIC's subway plan. In his report to the Planning Board 
Wilson recommended unification of the area's·transportation services under 
a Metropolitan Toronto Transit Commission and their operation by a system 
of zone fares. (52) He also discussed at length why an immediate fare 
increase would be necessary to keep the system financially viable. There 
might even come a time, he suggested, when annual expenses on the system 
would exceed revenues, although that had never happened before. "In such 
event," he pointed out, "the municipalities would be called upon to share the 
deficit in proportion to the benefit from the transit service received by 
each." (p. 6) 
Wilson's fare proposals caused an immediate outcry of opposition, 
especially from spokesmen for the city, near-in suburbs and Labour, who 
insisted that the TTC had a. huge surplus and had no right to consider an 
increase in fares.( 53) The reality was different, for a number of reasons. 
The subway was costing more than anticipated because of changes in 
construction plans to accommodate requests from the city government and 
city neighbourhoods. The federal government had withdrawn its offer of 
assistance when an expected post-war depression failed to materialize. 
Finally, inflation had brought rapid increases in capital and operating costs. 
Thus by 1950 TTC expenses were exceeding revenues. One year later the 
Commission both raised its fare (from 4/25¢ to 3/25¢) for the first time in 
its history and asked the City to borrow additional capital to allow it to 
complete the subway. 
The rapid decline in the TTC's financial fortunes coincided and 
constrasted with a period of substantial improvement in the financial base 
of municipal highway departments. In 1947 the provincial government made 
road-building grants available to cities and separated towns for the first 
time, and in 1949 it removed an upper limit on the amount if would pay 
toward municipal roads.( 54) Thus the area's local govenments could now 
look to the province to cover at least one-third of the cost of any new roads 
they decided to sponsor. Nonetheless in 1951 the Toronto and York Planning 
Board expressed concern that there had been no action on a metropolitan 
transit authority, pointing out that the alternative was to build more 
highway and parking facilities with costs "borne very largely by further 
taxation of real estate already overburdened." (55) The perception was that 
local governments and local taxpayers would have to pay to get more roads 
but they could have public transit for nothing. 
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A metropolitan transit authority was one of the structural changes 
endorsed by Ontario Municipal Board Chairman Lorne Cumming _in his 1953 
report calling for a metropolitan form of government for the Toronto area. 
Several of the changes that the province made in the area's governmental 
system on the basis of that report were designed to overcome perceived 
constraints on local government effectivness and thus strengthen the area's 
ability to realize its economic potential. For one thing, metropolitan 
government meant a pooling of local revenues for those purposes assigned to 
the newly-created metropolitan council and school boards, and thus made 
the resources of the cental city and richer suburbs available for improving 
services in revenue-poor suburban municipalities. For another, the change 
was intended to improve both the capacity and the willingness of suburban 
municipalities to accommodate low cost housing (including 
government-assisted rental housing) and thus reduce constraints imposed on 
the redevelopment and revitalization of the central city by the ring of 
dilapidated and overcrowded housing that surrounded the central business 
district. Over time it might also mean a reduction in the city's 
responsibility for social services as the suburbs absorbed an increasing 
share of the area's low income population. The change also brought an 
immediate increase in the size of provincial road building grants to 50o/o of 
approved metropolitan projects. 
There was no change in arrangements for financing public transit, 
however, despite Cumming's suggestion that the province formally recognize 
"the underlying liability of the metropolitan area for the provision of 
possible future deficits in this publicly owned system."(56) The legislation 
establishing Metropolitan Toronto in 1953 gave the new jurisdiction a public 
transit authority by the simple expedient of changing the name of the city 
company to the Toronto Transit Commission and adding two members to its 
governing board. It specified in language identical to that governing the 
Toronto Transportation Commission that its successor must cover both its 
operating and capital costs out of fare-box revenues. The TTC would also 
continue to pay those taxes and other costs that the city government had 
imposed on the system. 
There were substantial changes in the nature of the TIC' s obligations, 
on the other hand. Not only did the agency see its service area increase 
from 35 to 240 square miles but it also had to purchase and consolidate four 
independent bus lines and assume full financial responsibility for those 
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suburban services that had earlier received municipal subsidies. While the 
TTC was able in 1953 to pay off the last of its original debt to the city, 
therefore, it began its career with a new debt to the metropolitan 
corporation of $66.6 million ($13 million for the purchase of bus lines and 
$53.6 million for subway construction).((57) It immediately indicated 
that it intended to proceed slowly in meeting its new responsibilities, 
observing the same type of rules it had used in deciding when to make 
changes to the city system. It would provide "basic services only on the 
main arteries to established centres of industry or population." It would 
extend those services only when and where the state of suburban 
development warranted it. While it acknowledged "a duty to aid in 
community development by pioneering services which for the time being are 
not self-supporting but which give promise of becoming so in the near 
future," it warned that the pursuit of such a policy "beyond wise limits" 
would inevitably lead to disastrous results.( 58) It supplemented this 
conservative operating philosophy by instituting a five-zone fare system 
that meant that riders in the outermost parts of Metropolitan Toronto would 
pay twice as much to get downtown as those living in the city. 
A Conflict of Objectives 
The change in the TTC's composition and responsibilities brought an 
abrupt end to the relative harmony that had characterized the agency's 
relationship with its political environment, plunging it into a period of 
political conflict that severely damaged the organization's reputation for 
effectiveness and brought demands from several quarters for its dissolution 
and the transfer of its functions to a department reporting to a Committee 
of Metro Council. Some of the problems stemmed from a change in 
personalities. With the death of William McBrien in 1954 the TTC lost a 
chairman whose talent for public relations, leadership abilities and respect 
for professional judgment had helped foster good relations between the TTC 
and the community and between the Commission and its staff. In 1955 the 
agency gained a different kind of chairman in Alan Lamport, a former City of 
Toronto mayor who still harboured political ambitions and whose combative 
political style not only helped to alienate important elements of the TTC's 
external constituency but also created open dissension within the agency 
itself.(59) The TTC's political difficulties were symptomatic of problems 
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that went much deeper than differences in personality or political style, 
however. From the beginning there were fundamental differences of opinion 
both within the TTC and within its political environment about the nature of 
the agency's responsibilities and the role it should play in a new, 
greatly-enlarged community that was undergoing fundamental changes in its 
pattern of development and in the travel behaviour of its residents.(60) The 
attacks of its political critics were really efforts to make the TTC abandon 
operating rules that had helped make its forerunner an effective and 
financially successful city-wide service but that many now considered to be 
inappropriate to its new situation. 
Some of the earliest attacks on the TTC came from spokesmen for the 
governments of the developing suburban areas. The high priority that those 
governments had earlier assigned to transit improvements made the TTC's 
performance in the suburbs an important test of a metropolitan political 
experiment in which most suburbs were participating reluctantly. The TTC's 
go-slow policy on suburban services thus seemed like a betrayal of an 
implicit bargain made to win suburban compliance with the new 
arrangement. The transit agency added to this sense of injustice by 
requiring suburban residents to pay higher fares for services deemed 
inferior to those available in the city. It further exacerbated suburban 
disgruntlement by pressuring Metro Council to approve and help finance 
costly additions to the subway system at the same time it was telling 
suburban petitioners that it could not afford to add new bus routes in the 
outer districts. From the perspective of TTC management, however, the 
issue was not one of buses versus subways or suburbs versus the central 
city, as some critics maintained, but of choosing between investments that 
could only add to the agency's financial and operating difficulties and 
investments that might help to improve its situation. Densities were much 
lower in the suburbs than in the city (averaging 2350 persons per square 
mile in 1953 as compared to almost 20,000 in the city) and distances were 
greater- characteristics that meant that suburban buses would carry many 
fewer riders over longer distances than those in the city, and so were much 
more likely to operate at a loss. The prospects for subways looked much 
brighter, for ridership on the Yonge subway had not only exceeded 
predictions right after its opening in March 1954 but had also increased or 
remained stable between 1954 and 1959 while that on the rest of the system 
declined. The only routes that did not participate in the downward trend 
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were those that fed the subway. There seemed to be good reasons for 
concluding, then, that the long-term health of Toronto's public transit 
system depended on the construction of additional subways. 
While the TTC's emphasis on subways fed suburban dissatisfaction, its 
approach to their planning and location brought it into conflict with 
members of Metropolitan Toronto's Planning Board. At the root of that 
conflict was a difference in philosophy about the purpose that subways 
should serve. Metro planners, taking their cue from existing City of Toronto 
plans and the developmental goals of provincial and local backers of the 
metropolitan experiment, adopted as their primary objective that of finding 
ways to strengthen the city's downtown core as Metropolitan Toronto's 
commercial and cultural centre. They early concluded that it would be 
impossible both to achieve that objective and satisfy all travel demand into 
the center by building roads alone; that public transit was also necessary. 
They argued, therefore, that subways should be designed for the primary 
purpose of channelling commuter traffic into the downtown core on routes 
coming directly either from residential areas of high and medium density or 
from the terminal points of expressways serving areas of lower density.(61) 
The TTC's position, advanced principally by transportation consultant 
Norman Wilson, remained essentially the same as that used to justify the 
Yonge line in the 1940s. Subways, Wilson argued, should be regarded as 
integral parts of a metropolitan transit system having as its primary 
purpose "the continuing provision of adequate and desirable transit service 
to the inhabitants of the metropolitan municipality."(62) They should 
replace streetcars (which in any case were wearing out and no longer being 
manufactured) in heavily travelled corridors, and so help to relieve street 
congestion and prevent the deterioration of the central area. Wilson found 
a "complete absence of any consideration of the economics of transit 
operation .... "in the planners' concept of subways, and suggested this was 
the reason transit planning should remain under the control of an 
independent commission with substantial powers to carry out the "onerous 
duties" assigned to it.(63) 
The philosophical differences between the TTC and Metro Planners 
gave rise to a prolonged dispute about the location of Toronto's second 
subway, an east-west line along Bloor and Danforth Streets on the northern 
edge of the Central Business District. The TTC wanted to replace an 
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existing streetcar line with a linear subway under Bloor Street; the 
planners wanted to bring the line into and through the heart of downtown in 
a U-shaped loop, leaving the intervening section of Bloor Street to be served 
by streetcars, as a way of making the subway more usefuJ to downtown 
commuters travelling from the eastern and western sections of Metro. The 
dispute highlighed a weakness in the Metropolitan Toronto Act, which had 
assigned transit planning responsibilities to both the TTC and the 
Metropolitan Planning Board but had failed to clarify which body should have 
final say. In the end the decision fell to Metro Council which, at the 
prompting of Chairman Gardiner, decided in favour of the TTC. Thus Metro 
Council emerged from the incident as the body clearly in a position to decide 
where the area's new subways should go. That authority gained a financial 
basis over the next few years as the interested parties grappled with the 
most divisive of all transit issues to agitate Metro politics during this 
period: the question of what to do about the TTC's inability to fulfill the 
expectations of its constituents and its own members within the constraints 
of a mandate that required it to be self-supporting. The problem was 
apparent from the beginning, for the reconstituted Commission ended its 
first year of operation with a deficit of $2.4 million despite the opening of 
the subway and a substantial increase in ridership over the previous 
year.(64) There were three ways in which local decision makers could deal 
with the situation, and each appealed to a different set of interests. 
The first alternative was retrenchment to a position that would allow 
the TTC to continue to function as a completely separate and autonomous 
agency, covering all its costs and paying off its debt to Metro out of farebox 
revenues. This approach implied rigorous adherence to the policy of 
providing new services only when conditions made it likely that they would 
eventually pay their own way, cutbacks or elimination of unprofitable 
services and at least a postponement - if not the complete abandonment - of 
further subway construction. Various interests (including Metro Chairman 
Gardiner) continued to favour an independent and self-supporting TTC in 
principle but few were prepared to agree to the sacrifices or accept the 
consequences of keeping it that way. The suburbs were insistent in their 
demands for better service. Chairman Gardiner agreed with the planners that 
the city could not meet all its transportation needs by building expressways; 
that subways were also needed. He even advised Council not to be persuaded 
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out of that point of view by the availability of the 50o/o provincial subsidy for 
roads.(65) In his attempt to quell political opposition to the TTC he also 
secured the appointment to the Commission of former politicians like 
Lamport who pushed strongly for route expansion and public subsidy. Even 
the TTC tempered its conservative approach to suburban extensions with an 
early commitment not to curtail existing service on unprofitable routes. Its 
staff also argued the need for more subways in the interest of sustaining 
ridership. Nonetheless the years immediately before and after the formation 
of Metropolitan Toronto provided some evidence of what lay in store for the 
area's transit system if it had to continue to pay its own way. Per capita 
ridership fell in most years after the end of the war but dropped most 
sharply in the years following a fare increase. This was true even for 1955, 
despite the opening of the subway the year before. Past achievements had 
obviously not rendered the TTC immune to the "downward spiral" of rising 
fares followed by declining patronage and revenues that was afflicting most 
of the transit industry by that time. 
It was clear from an early stage, then, that if the TTC was to serve as 
an effective supplier of transit services on a metropolitan scale it would 
have to receive government assistance. Such assistance could take one of 
two forms: capital grants toward subway construction or subsidies to defray 
operating costs. TTC staff much preferred capital over operating assistance 
for a number of reasons. First, they had long argued that subways served a 
dual purpose- that of upgrading service and relieving street congestion. The 
latter function made them an alternative to roads and thus a legitimate 
charge on the governments that would otherwise have to pay for those roads. 
They also believed - naively, as it turned out- that it would be easier to 
keep subway than bus route decisions free of political interference because 
the reasons for building subways were straightforward and easy to support 
with existing ridership and traffic data. The experience with the Yonge 
subway also suggested that facilities built to replace heavily-used streetcar 
lines would at least cover their own operating costs, and so not add to the 
deficit. 
The success of the first subway also generated political backing for a 
continuing subway program and thus for capital grants. Much of this support 
came from the city and derived from the perceived benefits that subways 
brought both to private investors and the city tax base. A noticeable rise in 
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property values and stepped up redevelopment activity along the Yonge Street 
corridor seemed to confirm the TTC's earlier claim that the subway would 
contribute to downtown renewal and revitalization.(66) And an increase of 
transit usage in the Yonge corridor led Metro planners to accept the TIC's 
argument that the construction of subways could have salutary effects on 
the ci~y's traffic situation as a whole.(67) 
Not all parties active in transit disputes shared this enthusiasm for 
subways, of course. Representatives of the outer suburbs were particularly 
opposed, for they saw subways as of sole or primary benefit to the city and 
the reason for the TTC's failure to deal with deficiencies in suburban transit. 
This did not mean they constituted a bloc in favour of operating assistance. 
They were strongly opposed to supporting public transit out of Metro tax 
revenues, in fact, saying it would impose an unfair burden on suburban 
residents who were already paying a premium fare to use the transit system. 
They were prepared to consider the idea only if the TIC instituted a single 
fare for the whole of Metro. The TTC rejected this course of action, 
characterizing a single fare as a subsidy from Zone I riders, who constituted 
almost 90o/o of TIC patrons, to travellers on the less densely-populated, 
longer distance routes in the suburbs. Representatives of both the city and 
the inner suburbs defended the existing fare structure for the same reason. 
Complicating the issue still further was the attitude of provincial 
premier Leslie Frost, who believed that any support to public transit would 
cut down on the use of automobiles and thus cut into an important source of 
provincial revenue.(68) As the province had to approve any changes that 
Metro decided to make in its relations with its transit agency, this attitude 
stood in the way of a change in financial arrangements even in the unlikely 
event of agreement among local participants on the best course to follow. It 
is not surprising, then, ·that attempts to resolve political disputes were so 
piecemeal and tentative during the 1950s that they failed either to ease the 
TIC's financial difficulties or reduce the volume of criticism directed at the 
agency. The only financial adjustment of any magnitude to occur before 
1960 was a Metro decision to assume 55°/o of the construction costs of the 
east-west subway - less than the 75o/o requested by the TTC at the time but 
still enough to make Metro Council the senior partner in the subway building 
business. 
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Political infighting during Metro's early years did ~esult in a number of 
changes to the institutions most directly involved in transit 
decision-making. Within the TTC itself a dispute between Chairman Lamport 
and General Manager G.M. Duncan over control of daily operations led to a 
division of senior management responsibilities between two general 
managers, one for Operations and the other for Subway Construction, with 
Duncan assigned to the second position.(69) The move was intended to make 
management (especially Duncan) clearly subordinate to the Commission but 
it also deprived the agency of a single person to coordinate and articulate 
the viewpoint of the operating staff. The dispute between the TTC and Metro 
planners about the route of the east-west subway prompted Metro Council to 
add four more of its own members and the TTC Chairman to the Metro 
Planning Board.(70) Gardiner also agreed to let the Planning Board have 
additional staff for transit planning.(71) While he resisted pressures to 
dissolve the TTC entirely and place the transit system within a Department 
of Transportation responsible for both transit and highways, he did agree 
that Metro should appoint a liaison representative to attend TTC meetings as 
a nonvoting member and report to Council on matters affecting both 
bodies.(72) 
Financial and structural changes made before 1964 had the effect of 
weakening the TTC's influence in transit decision-making but provided little 
relief from its financial difficulties. That relief came only after a city 
attempt to have Metro approve a permanent operating subsidy not only failed 
but left Council so badly divided that transit disputes seemed to threaten the 
survival of Metro itself.(73) As it turned out, however, Metro Council was 
able to agree to extend the Bloor-Danforth subway into the suburbs - a 
proposal put forward by Metro planners in the interest of making the subway 
part of the Metro system and so overcoming suburban resistance to providing 
the TTC with more financial assistance. "We took the position," according to 
a senior planner of the time, "that subways serve a political purpose." (74) 
The ploy worked, for in 1964 Council accepted responsibility for 70o/o of both 
the cost of subway construction and of the TTC's accumulated capital debt. 
It then managed to persuade the province to reimburse it for 33 1 /3% of the 
cost of subway roadbeds. In the years that followed Council approved two 
extensions to the Yonge subway, making further financial concessions each 
time. By 1970 it had exempted the TTC from municipal taxes on property 
used for rapid transit purposes and was paying the entire cost of the most 
recently approved extension. The province had also increased its contribution 
to 50°/o of subway roadbed costs. 
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The extension of subway lines into low density suburban areas was 
inconsistent with the TTC's frequently-stated philosophy that subways 
should replace existing streetcar lines in heavily-travelled corridors. 
Nonetheless the TIC undoubtedly contributed to suburban willingness both to 
approve and help finance such projects by emphasizing the benefits in the 
form of new development and increased assessment that had flowed to the 
city from the Yonge Street subway and that would follow from the building 
of new lines. (75) The political appeal of subways had much to do with 
their perceived benefits to local economies. 
The decision on the Bloor-Danforth extension ushered in a period of 
relative calm in Metro Toronto transit politics. Not only was the TIC's 
financial situation somewhat improved, but there was also a decline in 
political infighting both within the TIC and between the agency and other 
branches of the metropolitan system. One reason for improved relations was 
new TIC leadership in the person of Ralph Day, a former City of Toronto 
mayor who joined the Commission in 1963 and soon became its chairman. Day 
was a businessman and a fiscal conservative whose respect for professional 
advice helped to heal the divisions between commissioners and their staff. 
Under his direction the Commission became more stable and less divided on 
policy issues (or at least managed to work out its differences in private) and 
began to present a more united face to the world. Day was also on good 
terms with Metro Chairman William Allen (who succeeded Gardner in 1961) 
and others he had worked with during his years as a city politician. The 
TIC's relations with Metro Council improved, therefore, even though the 
Commission barred the Metro liaison representative from discussions not 
directly related to subway construction -the only matter in which it 
recognized a legitimate Metro interest.(76) Its relations with Metro 
planners also became more cooperative, even though their philosophical 
differences persisted in the form of a prolonged disagreement about the 
route for Metro's third subway. The TTC wanted to build a subway to replace 
the heavily-used streetcar line on Queen Street, a busy east-west 
commercial street that bisected Yonge Street in the heart of the central 
business district. Metro planners believed the next project should be a 
subway within the alignment of a projected expressway (the Spadina) 
running in a north-westerly direction between downtown Toronto and 
suburban North York. The TIC kept a low profile on the issue, however, 
avoiding open disputes with Metro planners and leaving it up to city 
spokesmen to argue publicly for a Queen Street line. 
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Another reason why the transit system moved out of the political 
spotlight in the mid-1960s was an apparent i.mprovement in TTC 
performance. A steady increase in annual ridership between 1962 and 1968 
gave the system a look of greater stability and permanence. While fare 
increases in 1964 and 1967 sparked the usual wave of protests, they no 
longer seemed symptomatic of a system in the throes of a terminal illness. 
Gradual improvements in suburban service also made it easier for the TTC to 
defend its performance from attacks by its suburban critics. In figures 
compiled for Commissioner Carl Goldenberg's comprehensive review of 
Metropolitan Toronto (1963-1965), for example, the TTC was able to show 
that it had doubled its annual mileage of suburban bus operation -from five 
to ten million -between 1955 and 1963. In 1962 it had reduced the number of 
fare zones from five to two.(77) One year later it announced a plan for 
extensive additions to bus routes on the existing grid of suburban arterial 
streets, and within six months was able to report an increase of 17.6°/o in 
suburban bus mileage and 9.3°/o in Zone 2 passengers.(78) Its overall 
performance during its first ten years had not been as bad as some of its 
critics charged, in fact, for its 38°/o loss of ridership compared favourably 
with the average 48°/o loss experienced by transit systems in the rest of 
North America.(79) 
The TTC and its supporters were able to convince Commissioner 
Goldenberg to reject the advice of those who still wanted the TTC dissolved 
and its responsibilities transferred to a Metropolitan Toronto Transportation 
Department. The Commissioner recommended only that the Chairman of 
Metro Council should be ex-officio a full member of the TTC and called for 
more formal coordination of overall transportation planning between the 
staffs of the TTC, Metro Planning Board and other agencies. The provincial 
government made no changes at all either in the TTC or in its relationship to 
Metro Council when it reorganized Metropolitan Toronto in 1967. It was not 
long, however, before the TTC was embroiled in a new set of controversies 
that culminated in greater changes in its composition and its relationship 
with other units of Metro government than those Goldenberg had envisaged. 
At the root of these controversies was the failure of both Metro or provincial 
subsidies for subway construction to provide a long-term solution to the 
TIC's financial difficulties or to change the TTC's way of dealing with them. 
Suburban bus routes continued to operate at a loss and the rapidly rising cost 
of labour and materials during the 1960s placed additional pressures on 
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revenues. Under Day's leadership and with his full support the TTC continued 
to adhere strictly to the financially conservative rules of operation that had 
governed its operations in the past- carefully evaluating all proposals for 
changes in transit operations in terms of their implications for the TTC 
budget and rejecting most of those that implied any increase in costs or 
reduction in revenues. Conflict arose because of the growing incompatibility 
between this policy and changes taking place in the size and character of the 
Metropolitan Toronto population, in the pattern of residential development 
being fostered by public and private agencies and in the area's political 
institutions. 
The TTC under Attack 
The rapid growth of Metropolitan Toronto's population fed 
dissatisfaction with the TTC in two ways. First, it was not spread evenly 
throughout Metropolitan Toronto but was concentrated principally in the 
three outer suburbs, which meant that an increasing proportion of actual or 
potential transit users lived in the outer fare zone. Suburban members of 
Metro Council became ever more insistent in their demands for a single fare, 
therefore, especially after Metro's 1964 decision to increase its subsidy for 
subway construction. They argued that the infusion of suburban tax dollars 
into the transit system entitled suburban residents to the same treatment 
accorded residents of the city and inner suburbs; that the development of 
the metropolitan area had entailed a steady increase in the number of 
suburban jobs, many of them held by blue-collar workers who lived in the 
city; and that elimination of zone fares would encourage suburbanites to use 
transit and so help reduce the use of automobiles. To all these arguments 
TTC officials replied, as they had always done, that a single fare 
constituted a subsidy to suburban riders from those living in the inner 
zone. They made the same kind of response to petitioners who signified the 
second offshoot of Metro's growth: the proliferation of groups representing 
categories of persons making a claim to special treatment in transit 
decisions. To those requesting reduced fares for senior citizens and other 
groups, extension of existing student fares to encompass more hours of the 
day and then more days of the week, and elimination of fares altogether for 
such groups as school crossing guards, disabled and handicapped citizens 
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and convention delegates, the TTC replied that reduced fares of any kind 
constituted subsidies from some passengers to others. It insisted that 
municipalities or other governments that wanted to assist groups with 
special needs should do so out of tax revenues, not by imposing the added 
costs on transit riders.(80) To those who asked the TTC to design future 
subways to accommodate wheelchairs Commission members responded that 
the idea was both costly and impractical. It would not work, said one, 
unless streetcars and buses were also modified to the same end. It would 
be cheaper, suggested another, for the city to hire taxis to transport people 
whose handicaps prevented them from using the regular system.(81) 
As TTC service policy was bringing the agency into conflict with 
spokesmen for growing and diverse segments of the metropolitan population 
it was also becoming increasingly incompatible with the pattern of 
development occurring in most of the outer parts of Metro. Like suburban 
development throughout North America at the time, that taking place in 
Metro Toronto conformed to planning ideas that emphasized the separation 
of pedestrian from vehicular traffic, favoured a strict separation of land 
uses and promoted the isolation of institutional and commercial 
establishments from nearby streets, residential neighbourhoods and other 
buildings. The application of those principles in suburban planning resulted 
in residential subvdivisions based on a maze of local streets that provided 
no convenient through routes for buses; sprawling industrial parks that 
generated demand for transit only for brief periods during the morning and 
evening rush hours; and major commercial and institutional establishments 
surrounded by massive parking lots and landscaped open space. This pattern 
of development caused increasing difficulties in TTC/suburban relations as 
it generated rising demand for transit service from newly-developed areas 
located at some distance from the arterial roads to which the TTC confined 
most of its suburban bus routes. These straight north-south and east-west 
streets traced their origins to a grid of rural roads, spaced a mile and a 
quarter apart, laid out by government surveyors in the late eighteenth 
century. The TTC had always based its route network on that grid and the 
city had usually adhered to it in laying out streets to accommodate new 
development, locating secondary streets parallel to those contained in the 
original survey. Thus it had been relatively easy for the TTC to bring 
service into new parts of the city simply by building streetcar lines and 
adding bus routes along streets that bisected the major arteries. The 
suburban style of development was a different matter, and the TTC typically 
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refused requests for service into areas where convoluted street layouts 
meant longer bus journeys (and thus higher operating costs) than similar 
services provided on linear routes. Members of middle class, car-owning 
households were not the only persons affected by such refusals. The 
interiors of the large blocks bounded by arterial streets contained 
industries, schools, colleges, universiti~s and other institutions as well as 
a large amount of high density rental housing - some of it built with 
government assistance -containing a diverse population that included 
recently-arrived immigrant families, senior citizens and families living on 
public assistance. Thus the TTC's operating policy was imposing 
considerable hardship on those categories of persons who were most likely 
to require its services. 
The incompatibility between TTC operating rules and the service 
demands generated by a changing metropolis contributed to a growing image 
of the TTC as an agency that was insufficiently responsive to the needs of 
the community. So did the TIC's method of dealing with the public. During 
the Lamport years the Commisson had adopted the practice of meeting once 
a year with suburban councils to discuss service requests and decide on 
priorities. After that it routinely advised dissatisfied petitioners to 
channel their requests through their local aldermen to their local council. It 
did not meet with City Council, however, for Commissioners and most city 
officials agreed that the city was fully serviced. It also refused to meet 
with ratepayers' or other citizens' groups, barred the public from its 
meetings entirely and allowed the press and the Metro liaison 
representative to be present for only parts of them. This resistance to 
direct interaction with the public became an increasing irritant as the 
1960s wore on and Metro politics became imbued with the citizen activism 
and demands for citizen participation in government policy-making that 
characterized North American city politics at that time. By the late 1960s 
that activism was taking the form of increasingly well-organized protests 
against two processes in which the transit system was heavily implicated: 
the public and private redevelopment of the inner core to higher densities 
and the construction of the Spadina Expressway, which was progressing 
slowly but inexorably toward the central city from the northwest. 
A rise in citizen activism was only one of the important changes 
occurring in the TTC's political environment in the early part of the 1970s. 
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A second was the reorganization of Metropolitan Toronto Council that 
became effective on January I, 1967 - a change that shifted the balance of 
Council voting power toward the suburbs. Under the new arrangements the 
number of municipalities in the federation was reduced from thirteen to six 
but the suburbs gained eight new Council members, for a total of 20, while 
City representation remained unchanged at 12 seats. (The Chairman brought 
the total to 33). For the time being the powerful Executive Committee 
remained evenly divided between five suburban and five city members. 
Nonetheless the suburbs were now in a much stronger position than before 
to try to make the TTC change its ways. 
A third important change in the TTC's political environment was a 
developing provincial interest and involvement in public transportation 
policy-making. This interest initially took the form of a massive 
Metropolitan Toronto and Regional Transportation Study (MTARTS) that 
included mass transit as well as roads in its assessment of the region's 
long-term transportation requirements and the province's financial 
responsibility for meeting them. While the study's most immediate 
outcome was a commuter rail service initiated in 1967 to link downtown 
Toronto with Oshawa on the east and Oakville on the west, its work 
program suggested that the province might be ready to increase its support 
to municipal transit as well. 
The event that initiated a process of adjustment in the Metro/TTC 
relationship was a fare increase early in 1969. The immediate effect of 
that increase was to intensify pressure on the TIC and Metro Council for a 
fare rollback, the removal of zone fares and fare concessions to selected 
groups. When end-of-year figures showed a ridership loss for the first time 
in five years, political pressures evolved into a generalized demand for 
government subsidies to free the TIC from dependency on the farebox. 
Metro's first reaction to this new "crisis" in TIC finances was to agree to 
cover the loss to the TTC of providing reduced-price tickets to senior 
citizens in special categories of need. Early the next year (1970) it made 
two new appointments to the Commission. One, Gordon Hurlburt, was a 
recently-defeated North York Controller who represented those Metro 
Councillors who advocated the reduction of zone fares, opposed fare 
increases and supported fare concessions to transit dependent groups. The 
second new appointee was a retired Air Canada official thought to have good 
relations with the provincial government. (82) 
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These moves to make the Commission both more representative of and 
more responsive to its changing poJitical environment failed to satisfy 
those politicians (who existed in the city as well as the suburbs) who were 
arguing for total abolition of the TTC and the transfer of its functions to 
Metro Council. In May 1970 Council took another step in that direction, 
overriding the objections of Chairman A.M. Campbell to ask for a change in 
provincial legislation that would allow it to appoint one of its sitting 
members to the Commission. The provincial response was to give Council 
the right to establish a commission made up entirely of persons chosen from 
among its own members or those of any of the six constituent 
municipalities and to appoint commissioners for one-year rather than 
three-year terms- powers that enabled it to tie the TIC more closely into 
the Metro structure and make it more reflective of prevailing political 
attitudes. One senior provincial official described the government's action 
as a move designed to enable Metro Council to do away with an appointed 
TIC entirely and transfer its responsibilities to Metro Council whenever it 
wished to do so.(83) 
Despite the provincial action Chairman Campbell urged Council to 
continue the practice of appointing citizen members (that is, persons not 
currently holding elected office) to sit on the TTC. If it became Metro 
policy to have a commission composed of members of Council, he pointed 
out, each municipality would want to be represented.(84) Council's response 
was to appoint only one of its members, an alderman from the outer 
Borough of Etobicoke, to replace a long-time TIC member perceived to be 
too closely tied to the city. It was not long, however, before a series of 
events occurring in rapid succession spurred Metro Council to a more 
serious attempt to gain control over the Commission. The first of these was 
the provincial premier's announcement in June 1971 that the government was 
halting completion of the bitterly-fought Spadina expressway and 
substantially increasing its assistance to urban transit. Following closely 
on that decision was the completion of organizational arrangements for a 
comprehensive restudy and revision of the 1966 metropolitan transportation 
plan. The fact that the Metropolitan Toronto Transportation Plan Review 
(MTIPR) began its work soon after the cancellation of the Spadina Expressay 
meant that Metro planning staff would now have an even greater interest in 
the characteristics and development of the area's mass transit system than 
they had had in the past. A third event was an aggressive and 
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well-publicized challenge to the TTC operating philosophy mounted by a 
group representing a low income downtown neighbourhood whose requests 
for bus service had regularly met with refusals from TTC staff. The fourth 
was a municipal election late in 1972 that returned a City of Toronto 
Council with a majority of members who espoused the views of 
neighbourhood and community groups that had been opposing the 
transportation and developmental thrusts of existing city and metropolitan 
plans. That event seemed to signify the emergence of a political climate, 
particularly in the city, that would be supportive of a metropolitan 
transportation policy with a clear bias toward public transit. 
By the time these events began to occur the TTC and Metro had already 
completed an examination of alternative fare and subsidy policies and Metro 
had asked the province for assistance. In launching that examination, the 
TTC General Manager of Operations expressed a strong preference for a 
fare-by-distance arrangement, terming it the most equitable method of 
charging for service. In doing so he revealed how isolated staff had become 
from the current political climate by suggesting that the only difficulty 
with implementing such a system was that of developing automated fare 
collection equipment for buses.(85) As public subsidy became increasingly 
likely, however, the General Manager of Operations reiterated his long-held 
position that assistance for the purchase and construction of capital assets 
was the best way to encourage the growth of transit systems and maintain 
efficient operation. If some form of operating assistance were deemed 
necessary, he went on, it should take the form of a cost-sharing agreement 
rather than an ex-post-facto grant to cover all operating deficits. 
Assistance of the latter type, he maintained, was not conducive to 
management efficiency "and removes the measurement provided by the use 
of profitability accounting based on sound budgeting." There should also be 
a slow, controlled increase in the fare structure to keep pace with the rise 
in the cost of living.(86) This latter advice did not appear in the TTC's 
submission to Metro Council. Instead the Commission told Metro that the 
withholding of operating assistance would mean an annual fare increase 
that would hurt those who most depended on transit, contribute to the 
"downward spiral" that had done so much damage to transit systems 
elsewhere, particularly in the United States, and lead to increased 
automobile use and automobile pollution. It asked Metro and the province to 
assume responsibility for all capital, interest and depreciation costs, 
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reimburse the Commission for the difference between student and adult 
fares and relieve the TTC from various taxes. It emphasized that it was not 
asking for further relief from property taxes, however, because it was 
concerned about the size of the tax burden already being borne by Metro 
taxpayers.(87) Metro's reaction was to turn immediately to the provincial 
government, asking that it not only join Metro in providing those forms of 
assistance specified by the TTC but that it also consider the longer term 
possibility of making a grant based on total passengers carried.(88) 
The provincial response took the form of a new Public Transportation 
and Highway Improvement Act passed in July, 1971, only four months after 
Metro made its request and one month after cancellation of the Spadina 
Expressway. It authorized provincial grants of up to 50o/o of operating 
deficits of local transit systems, the actual amount to be based on 
population and the number of passengers carried, as long as municipal 
governments agreed to pay an equivalent amount. The act also made surface 
transit operations eligible for capital assistance for the first time. Metro 
Council agreed to pay its share of the subsidy and soon afterward approved 
the abolition of zone fares. The TTC remained opposed to such a move and 
refused to implement it. The only way out of the impasse was to change the 
membership of the transit commission to make it more amenable to the 
views of the Council majority, and by May 1972 Council had indicated it 
intended to do just that. 
As Metro Council became increasingly determined to secure a single 
fare the TTC was coming under attack from quite a different source -a 
community organization representing the interests of a low income Toronto 
neighbourhood that had been trying unsuccessfully for nine years to 
persuade the agency to establish a new bus route on Jones Avenue, a 
north-south street in the working class Riverdale community on Toronto's 
east side. The people in or near the street claimed that existing routes 
were too far from their homes; the TTC maintained that most people in the 
area were within the 2000-foot maximum distance from bus or subway 
service. A new service would not yield additional revenue, it said; it would 
merely take riders from nearby routes. In the beginning the neighbourhood 
abided by the TTC's rules, conveying its requests through its aldermen. In 
1971, however, it was able to hire a community organizer with the help of 
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government funds and under his tutelage adopted a more aggressive 
approach. (89) It assembled data to show that the area had a 
disproportionately large number of those types of residents (elderly, 
disabled, single parent families, women working at night and carless 
households) who were most in need of transit service. It also conducted a 
survey to demonstrate potential ridership. When discussions with TIC staff 
failed to produce immediate results, members of the group resorted to 
tactics designed to win wider political support and a hearing from the 
Commisson itself - a late night visit to the home of Chairman Day in the 
city's wealthy Rosedale neighbourhood, a direct appeal to Metro Council and 
a sit-in staged at TTC offices to gain admission to a Commission meeting. 
What had begun as an attempt to persuade the TTC to improve its service to 
a single neighbourhood had evolved into a widely-publicized attack on the 
TIC's mode of decision-making - particularly on its refusal to meet with 
community groups. 
In June 1972, in the midst of the zone fare dispute and the clamor for a 
Jones Avenue Bus, Chairman Day announced he would not seek reappointment 
to the Commission. Council filled the vacancy with Karl Mallette, a 
Scarborough Controller and Metro Council member with a long record of 
opposition to the TIC's suburban service and zone fare policies. Within the 
next two months the Commission had not only approved the Jones Avenue 
bus but had also agreed to open its regular meetings to small groups of 
citizens. In January 1973 Council appointed Paul Godfrey, a North York 
controller who, like Mallette, had long been advocating Metro takeover of the 
TTC, improved suburban service and a single fare. By the middle of that year 
Godfrey had become Metro Chairman while retaining his place on the transit 
commission and Council had added yet another suburban member to the TIC. 
While Metro Council was restructuring the TIC to make it more 
responsive to suburban concerns the provincial premier announced 
substantial additions to its public transit assistance program, including an 
increase in capital subsidies for up to 75°/o of the total cost of subway 
construction and capital equipment and IOOo/o of the cost of research and 
development of an intermediate capacity rapid transit system based on 
advanced technology. In making the announcement the premier outlined 
specific routes for the new technology in Metropolitan Toronto and other 
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Ontario cities. The province also proposed to extend to sections of 
Metropolitan Toronto a dial-a-bus program introduced outside the area in 
1970 as a feeder service to the GO Transit commuter system. From being a 
source of outside funding assistance for projects designed within 
Metropolitan Toronto the provincia1 government had quickly assumed the 
role of full-scale participant in Metro's transit policy-making. Its presence 
further complicated what had already become an elaborate decision-making 
process involving the TTC, Metro and municipal councils, Metro planning 
staff and, increasingly, spokesmen for neighbourhoods and groups having an 
interest in particular types of transit service. 
The changes in the TTC during 1972 and 1973 removed one roadblock to 
the realization of those changes in transit policy that TTC critics both 
inside and outside Metro Council had long been demanding. Provincial 
financial assistance reduced another. Metro Council indicated which of the 
two had been the greater restraint on its own transit inititiaves by waiting 
to extend reduced fares to all senior citizens until after the provincial 
government made its first promise of assistance and by endorsing 24-hour 
reduced fares for children and high school students only on condition that 
the province would pay half the cost. The Metro Executive Committee also 
refused to cover the additional deficit resulting from a uniform Metro-wide 
fare until it could secure the provincial government's agreement to pay half 
of it. The province instead advised the TTC to resist the idea. (90). The 
Commission approved the change nonetheless as soon as Godfrey joined its 
ranks. Metro and the provincial government then made the new fare 
structure eligible for assistance under the same terms that had applied to 
the old. In 197 4 the province went even further, agreeing to remove the 
ceiling on the amount of deficit eligible for 50°/o assistance as long as the 
TTC did not increase its fares. 
The Consequences of Politicization 
These years of growing political involvement in transit 
decision-making saw a number of policy changes and innovations that the 
TTC's critics and local transit boosters had long been advocating. The 
Commission revised a long-standing policy to phase out streetcars, deciding 
to retain all but one of its remaining streetcar routes and to rehabilitate its 
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fleet of aging vehicles. It undertook to operate three Dial-a-bus 
demonstration projects in North York on routes selected by the provincial 
government, with the province paying the entire cost of the experiment. 
Metro Council agreed to reserve the curb lanes of a few major arterials for 
exclusive use by TIC buses. The TIC undertook to build 125 passenger 
shelters (with 75°/o funding from the province) at locations selected by the 
area municipalities, with three quarters of them assigned to the three outer 
suburbs. It initiated a two-year pilot project to provide service to the 
physically handicapped on a demand-responsive basis, using 
specially-equipped vans, with Metro and the province sharing the costs 
between them. Finally the TIC introduced an experimental express bus 
service at a premium fare between downtown Toronto and a civic and 
commercial centre in the heart of suburban Scarborough. 
These same years were characterized by intensifed political infighting 
among all those participating in or affected by transit decisions. Within the 
TTC itself there was ongoing dissension between the Commission and its 
staff. Senior staff members argued against some of the innovations being 
promoted by provincial or local actors - particularly the dial-a-bus and 
express bus experiments - on the grounds that they were too costly and 
were unlikely to yield much improvement in overall transit service. With 
the advent of provincial funding, according to one senior manager, the 
Commission "lost the yardstick of economics" as a basis for 
decision-making. Staff members also felt that politicians on the 
Commission were using it as a political platform and so creating an 
atmosphere of great uncertainty for those who had to operate the system. 
They also felt under constant pressure to assemble data and prepare reports 
that they lacked the staff resources to provide. The politically-minded 
Commissioners, for their part, found the staff inflexible and uncooperative 
- wedded to outdated ideas and procedures and unwilling to adapt to the 
changes occurring around them. Some of them still harboured resentment at 
what they saw as the TTC's past neglect of suburban needs. Their 
unwillingness to abide by the "rules' that had traditinally guided TTC 
decision-making made them distrustful of staff advice and suspicious of 
staff motives. When the press on one occasion interpreted a TIC report as 
critical of the province's intermediate rapid transit initiative, for example, 
Commissioners accused the staff of writing and releasing the report 
without their knowledge (even though they had had it in their hands for 
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several months) and adopted tighter procedures for the preparation and 
distribution of reports.(91) They were anxious to stay on good terms with 
the province. 
There was also renewed friction between the TTC and Metro planners. 
The TTC responded to the province's plan for an intermediate capacity rapid 
transit system by pointing out that the routes recommended by the province 
conformed closely to routes proposed for intermediate capacity transit in a 
conceptual plan prepared by the TTC in 1969. It immediately released an 
updated version of that plan in which it endorsed the province's proposals 
but asked that priority be given to the construction of further extensions to 
the Bloor Street subway and construction of a subway on Queen Street.(92) 
Metro planners, already annoyed by the provincial invasion of their planning 
jurisdiction, saw this as new evidence of the need for legislative and 
structural changes that gave them clear authority to plan Metro's major 
transportation facilities. (93) 
Not only did the politicization of the TTC fail to end controversy about 
transit issues; it also did not end Metro Council's efforts to bring the agency 
under its control. During 1973 and 197 4 Council required the TTC to send a 
representative to meetings of its Transportation Committee and to make its 
agenda available to all members of Metro Council. It also required Metro's 
Commissioner of Roads and Traffic to attend TTC meetings. These moves to 
encourage cooperation among the area's transportation bureaucracies did not 
satisfy those who wanted Metro to absorb public transit into a Metro 
Transportation Department that also had responsibility for roads and 
parking. One of these persons was Metro Chairman (and TTC Commissioner) 
Paul Godfrey, who in February 1974 asked Metro's Executive Committee to 
investigate methods of integrating the TIC's 6900 employees into the Metro 
bureaucracy. Senior members of TTC staff lobbied vigorously against the 
proposal, with the result that Council decided to hire a consultant to 
recommend the best organizational structure for the Commission. In his 
report the consultant noted that staff morale at-the TTC was at an all time 
low and identified recurring talk of amalgamation as a contributing 
factor.(94) He acknowledged the conservative, business-minded orientation 
of top management but also suggested that the existing board was "too 
political" - too representative, in other words, of current political opinion 
and not necessarily inclined to act in the public interest. After detailing 
the extent of Metro involvement in transit matters he suggested that the 
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only TTC functions that would benefit from better integration with other 
branches of Metro government were planning and top level policy and budget 
review. He also indicated a need for better documentation of the standards 
used to evaluate TTC services and called for a chief executive officer or 
single general manager to oversee and coordinate staff activities. In 
conclusion he recommended that the Commission be retained but that it be 
restructured to include the Metro Chairman and one member of Metro 
Council, a representative of the business community, a person nominated by 
a citizens' group and the TTC General Manager sitting ex-officio. 
Metro Council quickly indicated that it had no intention of allowing the 
TIC's chief executive officer to sit on a restructured Commission. At the 
same time it rejected Chairman Godfrey's recommendation to leave the TTC 
as it was, with three elected and two non-elected members. Hencefore, it 
decided, the TTC would consist of the Metro chairman, one member of 
Council and three non-elected persons. The decision made little immediate 
difference in the composition of the TTC, for Council made its next 
appointments from among its former rather than its sitting members. It 
did suggest, however, that a majority on Council was now ready to distance 
itself from TTC affairs. There are two possible explanations for this 
change of attitude. One is that Council members wanted to be less 
implicated in decisions capable of generating intense political feelings at 
the neighbourhood level and thus entailing a degree of political risk. A 
second is that there were clear signs that the course being followed by the 
politicized Commission was an expensive one. The TTC deficit had risen 
from $6.2 million in 1972 to a projected figure of $30 million for 197 4, a 
trend that meant that Metro and the province faced the prospect of rapidly 
increasing outlays on the transit system in the years ahead. 
A strike of TTC employees later in 197 4 provided new evidence that 
close association with the TTC could entail both financial and political 
costs. The strike occurred after TTC management and commissioners, in a 
rare show of unity, resisted union demands as excessive and blamed 
open-ended provincial·funding for encouraging the union to make them. 
After the strike had lasted 23 days with no sign of settlement the 
provincial government legislated the employees back to work and appointed 
an arbitrator to settle the dispute. The arbitrated award struck a 
compromise between the wage increase demanded by the union and the offer 
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made by the TIC. It also met several union demands for changes in 
operating procedures that added to TIC operating costs. The TIC's General 
Manager would subsequently blame the settlement for a 24.4°/o increase in 
operating expenditures.(95) The strike also brought an end to the political 
career of Commissioner Karl Mallette, whose defeat as controller in 
predominantly working-class Scarborough was attributed to criticisms he 
had directed at the transit union in the early days of the strike. 
By the end of 197 4 even some commissioners (who now consisted 
entirely of sitting or former members of Metro Council) had begun to 
question whether the Commission was not too involved in details of 
operation and whether the publicity surrounding the TIC's internal 
differences were not having damaging effects on the agency's public 
relations. Early in 1975, therefore, the TIC engaged its own consulting firm 
to review and recommend changes in internal staff structure and soon 
afterward initiated a search for a Chief General Manager.(96) It ultimately 
went outside the organization to hire Michael Warren, a provincial senior 
civil servant with no experience in public transit but with good connections 
in the provincial bureaucracy and a reputation for hard work and initiative. 
His role was not only to coordinate all staff activities and convey staff 
recommendations to the Commission but also to act as a liaison between the 
TIC and outside governments at the staff level. Even before Warren arrived 
on the scene in 1976, in fact, the Commission had begun to take steps to 
reduce the possibility of public controversy and improve its relations with 
outside interests by discussing contentious issues at private meetings to 
forestall disagreements at regular (open) meetings, by adopting an 
expanded program of community relations to facilitate interaction between 
TIC officials and community groups, and by developing a closer working 
relationship with Metro's Commissioner of Planning and Commssioner of 
Roads and Traffic. (97) 
The TTC's review of its management structure and procedures occurred 
at a time when its growing deficit was beginning to attract considerable 
criticism from the press and other watchdogs of public spending. While 
most of that criticism fell on the TTC, it also reflected adversely on the 
apparent willingness of the metropolitan and provincial governments to pay 
unlimited amounts to support the system. Early in 1975 the province again 
placed an upper limit on the total subsidy it would pay, at the same time 
lifting the freeze on fares. A TIC announcement of a fare increase shortly 
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afterward prompted an intense debate in Metro Council, which ultimately 
turned down motions that would have committed it to increase its subsidies 
to forestall the increase or to extend reduced fares to people on welfare and 
the working poor. It agreed only to ask for a share of federal and provincial 
taxes on gasoline, drivers' licenses and registration fees, seek provincial 
permission to levy a surtax on business assessments for transit purposes, 
foster studies of ways to use housing and land use policies to improve 
public transit operations and retain children's and pensioners' fares at their 
existing levels. Not only did fares go up but they did so again less than a 
year later, after the provincial government limited the size of its in cease to 
5% and Metro again decided not to exceed it. The two increases amounted to 
a 60% rise in less than II months. 
Fare increases were not the only signs that the expansionist period 
was coming to an end. The provincial government withdrew funding from 
two dial-a-bus routes in 1974 and from the third in 1976 and the TTC 
immediately ceased their operation. The service ended for reasons that 
accorded closely with reservations earlier expressed by TTC staff. The 
small buses were competing with regular TTC vehicles, which provided more 
frequent service on nearby arterials, and the TIC's labour contract made it 
difficult to experiment with routings and destinations. Operating deficits 
were high and neither the TTC nor Metro Council was willing to continue the 
experiment if it meant absorbing the operating losses. The express bus 
service to Scarborough Town Centre experienced a similar fate, with the 
TTC deciding to end the service after only a few months of operation 
because of limited ridership and high operating losses. 
It had taken less than five years from the time the provincial 
government changed the rules governing TTC appointments for both Metro 
Council and the politically...:minded transit commission to lose their 
enthusiasm for making transit operations more responsive to community 
interests and concerns. During that time, however, local politicians and 
members of local government bureaucracies were in a better position than 
ever before to effect changes in transit policy that conformed to the 
demands of their constituents. Thus the decisions taken during that period 
provide an opportunity to assess whether administration of transit services 
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by elected officials is likely to be more responsive to the needs of those 
most likely to depend on transit than administration by an appointed board. 
The transit decision that probably had the most important 
implications for the long run performance of Metro's public transit system 
was the approval given by Metro Council in 1973 to the construction of a 
Spadina subway within the alignment originally proposed by the planners; 
that is, within the corridor of the cancelled Spadina expressway. In making 
that decision Metro rejected an alternative alignment proposed by the TTC 
and approved by a joint metro/provincial committee of transportation 
officials charged with overseeing the review of the Metropolitan Toronto 
plan. The TIC alignment would have brought the new subway into the city on 
a direct north-south route parallel to or under a major traffic artery with 
heavily-used bus and streetcar service. Thus it conformed to the TTC's 
philosophy of using subways to upgrade service on heavily-travelled routes 
and remove surface transit vehicles from congested streets. It also would 
have meant better service for existing transit users. Much of the route 
actually chosen by Metro Council passes through ravines at some distance 
from residential neighbourhoods, and thus relies heavily on feeder buses for 
patrons. The reason commonly given for that choice was the lower capital 
costs involved in building the line. The provincial government by this time 
was paying 75°/o of the capital costs, however, while Metro was responsible 
for paying 50°/o of all operating losses in perpetuity. Operating 
characteristics or long-term operating costs received little attention in 
Metro's deliberations about the Spadina route, in fact. The real reasons for 
Metro's choice were pressure exerted on Metro Council by North York 
politicians and residents, who believed that construction of a subway in the 
Spadina corridor would keep the alignment open for an expressway, and the 
dislike felt by many suburban councillors for city politicians of a "reform" 
persuasion, some of whom had entered city politics as members of citizens' 
groups opposing the Spadina expressway. 
Other decisions of importance to actual or potential transit users 
were those aimed at meeting the demands of particular segments of the 
local population. Suburban residents were the principal beneficiaries of 
politically-motivated transit decisions, the most important of which were 
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suburban subway projects and the elimination of zone fares. According to 
their critics, concessions to suburban transit demands constitute a form of 
subsidy from central city to suburban riders and a reason for TTC deficits 
and its dependence on operating subsidies. The intensity of the fight to 
achieve them suggests, however, that they may also have been necessary to 
ensure continued political support for the transit system and perhaps even 
for Metro itself. Nor can it be assumed that the city-suburban transfer they 
entailed was a transfer from low income city residents to affluent 
suburbanites. Metropolitan Toronto has developed in such a way that the 
suburbs -or at least substantial sections of them - have acquired an 
increasing proportion of those population groups (recently-arrived 
immigrants, low income and single parent families, elderly citizens ) 
commonly associated with "inner" or "central" cities, while the city has 
experienced a gradual conversion of its inner residential districts to middle 
class use. Both these trends fulfill one of the earliest objectives of 
metropolitan government (and one promoted by city interests and 
metropolitan officials alike): that of encouraging the dispersal of housing 
for all income groups, including those requiring government assistance, 
throughout the metropolitan area as a way of facilitating downtown 
redevelopment. Thus the efforts to reduce or eliminate city/suburban 
disparities in transit service has simply been one element of a political and 
economic process that has reduced disparities in other aspects of the area's 
social and economic character. 
Groups representing some elements of the so-called "transit 
dependent" population also experienced considerable success in achieving 
their goals. Senior citizens and students got lower fares. 
Physically-handicapped residents, although unsuccessful in their efforts to 
persuade the TIC to make the entire system accessible to persons in 
wheelchairs, did manage to achieve a demand-responsive bus service that 
has gradually expanded its operations since its inception in 1973. 
All changes in TTC fare and service policies in the early 1970s 
affected groups whose members vary considerably in income and in the 
transportation alternatives they have available. Groups that sought 
assistance on the basis of financial need alone were less successful in 
getting political support. Metropolitan and local politicians seldom 
seemed any more inclined than transit officials to take relative need into 
account in their transit decisions. It is true that Jones Avenue got its bus 
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service, and it did so partly because politicians on the Commission were 
influenced by newspaper articles comparing the TTC's treatment of poor 
neighbourhoods unfavourably with its treatment of wealthy ones.(1 00) An 
incident not long afterward indicated that a politicized decision-making 
environment did not guarantee that lower income neighbourhoods would 
receive sympathetic treatment in transit decisions, however. It occurred 
after the provincial government decided in 197 4 to cancel two dial-a-bus 
services and turn the vehicles over to the TIC to operate on routes of its 
own choosing. There were two contenders. One was a wealthy North York 
neighbourhood (the Bridle Path) of large single family homes located in a 
pocket of ravine land at some distance from the nearest arterial streets. 
Area residents had always opposed plans to improve the arterial road 
network to allow buses to penetrate the area but they gave strong support 
to a campaign for a mini-bus seNice. TTC staff and some members of the 
Commission opposed the idea, insisting that the service was just for "maids 
and kids". The group was able to muster support from the Mayor and Council 
of North York, a member of the provincial legislature and Metro Chairman 
Godfrey, who at one point persuaded the TIC to reverse a negative vote 
taken at a meeting he had not attended. The second group seeking mini-bus 
service was one representing the large Downsview district of 
north-western North York- an area that had experienced extremely rapid 
residential growth in the recent past, much of it in the form of low cost, 
high density apartments and town house complexes, both public and private. 
Leaders of the campaign compiled statistics to document the distances that 
many area residents had to travel to bus routes on arterial roads and to 
local shopping centres, schools and recreation facilities. They conducted a 
survey that showed 97o/o of respondents to be in favour of a mini-bus 
service. Their data also showed the district to have a much larger 
population than the Bridle Path neighbourhood and to pay more in taxes to 
North York, despite the lower incomes of its residents. TIC staff members 
were sympathetic but said the decision rested with North York Council. The 
matter was settled at a large public meeting where members of that 
council heard arguments from both groups before deciding that the seNice 
should go to the Bridle Path. A second service went to a third area of North 
York that had frequently asked for but failed to receive regular service 
because the borough had not made necessary road improvements.(1 01) 
Downsview neighbourhoods had to wait until the opening of the Spadina 
subway in 1978 to secure better transit service. 
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A problem for the Downsview group was its inability to command the 
kind of political backing that strengthened the campaign of its rivaL Its 
principal outside support came from nearby York University, which had had a 
long history of unsuccessful attempts to secure better bus service. 
Otherwise it had to rely on internal leadership and the backing of local 
residents. Not only were those residents harder to mobilize than the middle 
class residents of the Bridle Path district but the two persons who led the 
campaign both had demanding jobs and were not always able to attend 
meetings. One of them was a socially-concerned reform alderwoman - one 
of only two reformers on North York Council -who had already antagonized 
her colleagues by pointing out neighbourhood problems resulting from too 
rapid development at too high densities, and by continually pressing for 
better community services. Nonetheless she felt that her efforts had not 
been wasted, for at her instigation the public meeting approved a motion 
asking TIC staff to report on criteria for new routes and for evaluating 
existing routes. 
I didn't like the idea of having one neighbourhood fighting against 
another for a bus service. But I was trying to point out that when 
the TTC had to make choices they are going to have to look at 
existing routes. I was trying to show with data that there had to be 
priorities.(1 02) 
Evidently she had concluded that her neighbourhood would fare better from 
the application of impersonal operating rules than it had from the decisions 
of its elected council. 
Another group that achieved substantial success in effecting a change 
in TTC policy was "Streetcars for Toronto" -an organization of street 
railway boosters that succeeded in persuading the TTC to reverse a ten year 
old policy to retire its streetcars. The vigour of this group's campaign and 
the support it mustered in the community surprised TTC officials long 
accustomed to complaints from disgruntled motorists who disliked sharing 
streets with streetcars and streetcar tracks. The victory did not amount to 
a comeback for streetcars, however. At the group's instigation the TTC 
undertook to restore streetcars on downtown Spadina Avenue but gave up 
the attempt in the face of city council and ratepayer opposition to turning 
loops needed at both ends of the line. 
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Local council and citizen opposition also .helped thwart attempts to 
confront what an MTIPR report identified as "the most significant 
weakness in the area's transit system": the slowness of transit service, 
particularly on surface routes, because of congestion caused by auto 
traffic.(1 03) One such attempt was the reserved bus lane experiment 
introduced during 1973 and 197 4 after prolonged negotiations between the 
TIC, the Metro Commissioner of Roads and Traffic and Metro Council. The 
Commissioner of Roads and Traffic would agree to having reserved lanes 
only on streets with at least five lanes of traffic, a requirement that few 
streets could satisfy. There were immediate objections nonetheless from 
motorists, nearby neighbourhoods and the owners of stores fronting on 
affected streets. Metro ended the experiment on all but two streets after 
eighteen months, saying that time savings were too small to justify the 
disruption involved.(1 04) 
City and suburban governments were often quick to respond to 
neighbourhood demands for transportation system changes that worked 
against the interests of the transit system and its clients. In the suburbs 
such demands resulted in the removal of one subway station from the 
Spadina line, decisions not to provide parking facilities near others and 
withdrawal of a new bus service soon after it was instituted. The city's 
behaviour was the more noteworthy, however, for it quickly dispelled the 
expectation that the reform city council that assumed office in 1973 would 
be more supportive of transit than its predecessor. At best the city's 
treatment of transit issues was ambivalent. It backed a Toronto Parking 
Authority decision to raise its rates on downtown lots, saying it wanted to 
encourage commuters to use transit, despite the TTC's insistence that it did 
not have enough subway capacity to carry more rush hour passengers. Not 
long afterward, however, it agreed to instal traffic control devices 
requested by central residential neighbourhoods, leading the TIC to 
complain that increased traffic on nearby arterials were causing delays in 
bus service. City aldermen protested when the TIC reduced the number of 
streetcars on a downtown route. They protested even more vigorously, 
however, to an MTIPR proposal for a new light rapid transit line on a busy 
east-west street in the northern half of the city. In general, a commitment 
to protect neighbourhoods and a strong anti-development bias prompted the 
reform council to oppose virtually any change in the city's transportation 
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system that would facilitate movement into and out of the core even if such 
change would benefit existing transit users. 
One important consequence of the city's attitude was a shift in the 
focus of metropolitan planning away from downtown development toward a 
more decentralized concept. The developmental pattern emphasized by the 
Metropolitan Toronto Transportation Plan Review featured suburban nodes of 
high density commercial and residential use linked to each other and to the 
central city by rapid transit. It was a concept that recognized the city's 
interest in reducing development pressures on the core and the suburbs' 
growing aspirations for thriving city centres of their own. It was also one 
that emphasized the role of public transit in the area's future development 
and played down the role of the automobile. This did not mean that Metro 
planners were any more willing to take up the cause of the transit user than 
were local governments, however. At public meetings arranged as part of 
an extensive public participation program, members of the Review staff 
sometimes expressed impatience at the frequency with which local 
residents raised questions concerning routes, schedules or availability of 
local bus service. The function of the Review, they insisted, was to 
identify the major transportation facilities required in the future to serve 
the land use pattern desired by metropolitan area governments and citizens. 
It was the TIC's job to look after details of transit operation. 
Aftermath 
Michael Warren's arrival at the TTC in 1976 to take up duties as Chief 
General Manager ushered in a new period of adjustment in the TTC's 
activities and its relationship with other Metro agencies. One of Warren's 
first acts was to initiate a comprehensive staff reorganization designed to 
increase the agency's capacity for policy and financial planning.(1 OS) The 
reorganization plan also outlined a work program to which TTC staff 
adhered closely in the years that followed. Among its early products was a 
report devoted to a detailed specification and, where possible, 
quantification, of "standards for evaluating existing and proposed 
routes."(1 06) It was an attempt to expand on and formalize the operating 
rules that had always guided TTC service decisions. While it enlarged on 
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those rules it did not depart from them in substance or emphasis. Of the six 
criteria identified as "essential to the development of a uniform and 
effective method" of route evaluation, "Route Economics" received greatest 
emphasis, followed by "Accessibility." as measured by walking distance 
from nearest available transit. The report argued that services intended 
solely or primarily to serve the transit dependent or to serve land use 
planning objectives should receive "a special public service subsidy". It 
also reaffirmed the TTC's intention to adhere to its practice of providing a 
grid system of routes on major arterials except in "special circumstances." 
The organizational changes over which Warren presided were an 
attempt to rebuild the TTC's capacity to function as a quasi-independent 
public corporation within the constraints of a changed political 
environment. In outlining the renewal program Warren noted that "external 
factors" had become a major source of influence on the TTC "because they 
have implications for the role of the Commission itself and emphasize the 
need for a closer working relationship between the Commission, its 
Management and its financial planning partners at Metro and the 
Province."(1 07) Those factors had already produced changes in the 
relationship between the TTC and the metropolitan government. Senior TTC 
officials were working with the Commissioner of Roads and Traffic and the 
Commissioner of Planning on a Technical Transportation Planning 
Committee to develop jointly-backed proposals for major transportation 
projects. The TTC and Metro Council had also agreed to establish an 
intergovernmental committee on transit financing to clarify what the TTC 
was expected to do in return for operating subsidies and to establish long 
term policies. Both these cooperative ventures were responses to another 
external factor that impinged on the activities of both bodies- the 
prominent role the provincial government had assumed in urban transit 
policy-making, both as a source of funds and as a producer (through its own 
public corporation, the Urban Transportation Development Corporation) of 
transit equipment (streetcars and an elevated light rail rapid transit 
system). 
The renewal program got underway while the provincial government 
was considering a Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto report 
recommending that " responsibility for operating the transit system be 
vested in the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto" in the interest of 
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achieving greater coordination and accountability in the planning, finance 
and administration of the area's transportation services.(I08) Warren 
opposed this recommendation, saying it guaranteed "against a return to 
stable, predictable conditions for the TTC."(1 09) The provincial government 
later noted, however, that the recommendation had the support of all of 
Metro Toronto's member municipalities except North York and advised Metro 
Council that it was prepared to give it direct control of the TTC if Metro so 
wished.(11 0) Council made no move to act on the suggestion. Even 
Chairman Godfrey believed that further change was unnecessary. 
Now Metro has all the major decision-making powers (for 
example, on light rapid transit, the Spadina subway, subway 
extensions, the fare structure, reserve bus lanes.) There is no 
reason to take away its operational responsibilities.(111) 
Metro Council actually aided the TTC in its attempts to reestablish its 
separate identity by appointing fewer politicians (either former or active) to 
the Commission and by appointing more members with a background in 
business and community service. 
The provincial government has probably done most to assist the TTC's 
efforts at organizational renewal, however, despite its professed 
willingness to see the TIC become part of the Metro bureaucracy. Its 
contribution stems from a funding formula introduced in 1976 that bases 
operating subsidies to municipal transit systems on the size of population 
being served. TIC officials welcomed the policy (which has remained in 
force ever since) as a contribution to greater predictability, stability and 
efficiency in its operations. They asked only that the province amend its 
formula to provide additional assistance to major new transportation 
facilities (like the Spadina subway, which had not yet opened.) The 
resulting arrangement left the TTC responsible for meeting 70o/o of its costs 
out of fare box revenues, with Metro and the province splitting the remainder 
between them. The TTC chose to fulfill its responsibility with a "user's 
fair share policy" that entails small annual increases in fares to keep up 
with inflation. It takes the position that small regular fare increases 
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discourage fewer riders than cutbacks in service - an argument very like 
that used by the agency's first general manager to defend the fare structure 
implemented in 1921. Although fare increases remain a source of political 
controversy, Metro Council has consistently rejected proposals that it 
assume a greater share of TTC operating deficits to prevent them from 
occurring. 
Conclusion . 
The objective that has tended to override all others in the transit 
decisions of Toronto area governments has been to protect the local tax 
base and local taxpayers from having to contribute toward this service. 
Only in unusual circumstances have those governments taken an active 
interest in exploring the potential of urban transit to fulfill two other 
objectives with which it is frequently identified: those of promoting 
community development and securing transportation for community 
residents. In the Toronto area those circumstances have occurred only 
three times in this century: during a short period before the outbreak of 
World War I, an even shorter period in the late 1920s and a prolonged period 
that began with the formation of Metropolitan Toronto in 1954 and did not 
end until the late 1970s. During the first period the city council decided to 
build its own street railway lines in newer parts of the city and to buy out 
the private company that had earlier contracted to serve the older districts. 
During the second it launched a judicial inquiry into the way its appointed 
transit commission was conducting its affairs. During the third the 
metropolitan council gradually took responsibility for subway location 
decisions and subway financing away from its transit commission and then 
quickly surrendered some of that responsibility to the provincial 
government. In the latter part of the period it also assumed partial 
responsibility for the commission's operating deficit. 
The three periods had a number of important similarities despite their 
occurrence at widely separated points in time and at different stages in the 
area's development. All were periods of rapid urban development and 
expansion sustained by rapid growth in the national and local economies. 
All produced intense political controversy about transit issues, much of it 
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centering on the transportation requirements of persons living in 
newly-populated districts outside the boundaries of the older, more densely 
settled central area. All were characterized by a ~elaxation of constraints 
on the financial capacity of local government to initiate new services or 
expand existing ones. All came to an end when economic growth slowed 
down; the second one abruptly with the onset of severe depression in 1929; 
the other two somewhat more slowly. Finally, all were characterized by 
politically-induced changes or perturbations in the organizational 
arrangements for transit administration. 
The model that has characterized the administration of Toronto's public 
transit system for most of its history has been the public corporation or 
independent commission. It is clear from surveying the history of that 
system that this is the model that local governments perceive as most 
capable of fulfilling the objective of minimizing their own financial 
responsibility or political culpability for transit decisions. It is the model 
the city government selected when it took over its transit system at a time 
when the industry was not only experiencing rising costs and falling profits, 
but also facing an uncertain future. It is also the model to which 
successive governments have returned at times when they have wanted to 
reduce or stabilize their level of involvement in transit operations. It has 
never fulfilled the expectation of some of its advocates that it would allow 
transit operators to pursue an independent course, however, by removing 
them from political pressure and the need to accommodate political 
interests. Both the Toronto Transit Commission and its predecessor, the 
Toronto Transportation Commission, have been continuously and often 
intensely involved in dialogue and disagreements with members of various 
branches of local government and representatives of community interests 
about transit needs and priorities. In these interactions the Commission 
has consistently advocated an operating and investment strategy designed 
to secure a balance of costs and revenues and to set aside enough funds to 
maintain or improve the system as circumstances dictate. As long as local 
governments were more concerned with avoiding financial or political 
liability for transit decisions than with achieving other types of objective, 
that strategy allowed the agency to function in relative harmony with its 
environment. At times when local governments have adopted more 
expansionist goals their dissatisfaction with that strategy has resulted in 
- 61 -
attacks on and weakening of the model. The result has a been a gradual shift 
toward the alternative model -administration of the transit system by the 
local council or by persons directly accountable to it. 
The Toronto case study lends support to the argument that operation of 
public transit by a public corporation is likely to be more efficient (less 
costly to government and taxpayers, that is) than operation by a local 
government. This is not necessarily because the two models engender a 
difference in the philosophy of those who actually operate the system. In 
those instances when political considerations displaced fiscal prudence as 
the dominant basis for Toronto's transit decisions the system's operators 
(the Department of Works in one case; the staffs of the Toronto 
Transportation Commission and the Toronto Transit Commission in the 
others) remained strong advocates of the more conservative approach. The 
corollary of this observation, then, is that the public corporation model is 
unlikely to satisfy those members of the local community or its government 
who look to transit as an instrument for promoting or assisting the 
development of new parts of a city or metropolitan region. Its natural 
inclinations are to consolidate and, when finances allow, improve its 
services in areas of established usage. Thus the use of transit as a 
developmental tool requires strong incentives and ongoing participation 
from government. 
When it comes to assessing the contribution that each of the two 
models made to the type and quality of service rendered to Toronto area 
residents the issues become more complex. Certainly it was city 
government intervention (and financial involvement) that brought transit 
service to residents of the newly-annexed districts of the City of Toronto in 
the decade preceding public takeover in 1921. It was also intervention by 
the metropolitan and provincial governments in the early 1970s that induced 
the TTC to change its fare policy in ways that benefitted senior citizens, 
students and suburban residents, and to provide a special service to the 
physically handicapped. The case study suggests, however, that neither the 
transit operators nor local governments were inclined to attach much 
significance to evidence of transit need or dependency in deciding where 
new services should go. At the same time they differed in the way they 
arrived at their decisions. Transit operators tended to base decisions on 
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such impersonal measures as actual or potential ridership, density of 
development of the area requesting service and average walking distance to 
the nearest available transit stop. Local governments were more likely to 
respond to pressures exerted by organized interest groups. The mode of 
decision making followed by transit operators seems to be a more reliable 
way of ensuring that transit becomes available to the largest proportion of 
those urban residents whose income circumstances make car ownership 
financially difficult or impossible, for a number of reasons. First, such 
persons are likely to live in areas of the city th~t satisfy the density 
criteria used to assess potential ridership. Second, the persons or 
neighbourhoods that are best equippped with the political resources needed 
to convince politicians to accede to their demands are typically those for 
whom transit service is likely to serve merely as a supplement to private 
transportation, not as the primary form of mobility. Finally, the effect of 
neighbourhood and group pressure on transit decisions tends more often to 
work against than in favour of the interests of transit users in general. 
What Alan Altshuler observed for the United States seems to hold equally 
well for Toronto. 
The primary mobilizing incentives for individual citizens who 
participate in transportation planning ... tend to be fear and 
indignation. The objective of improved service is rarely sufficient 
to motivate sustained or energetic participation. Citizens expend 
the time and energy required for effective participation mainly in 
order to protect their homes and immediate community 
environment.(113) 
More often than not, the effect of such action is to induce local governments 
to reject measures that will improve the operation of the transit system 
and to adopt measures that made its operation more difficult. 
It would be a mistake to conclude, however, that the public corporation 
model allows transit operators to override or ignore community opinion 
with impunity. The threat of takeover or even dissolution by an elected 
branch of government is a real one for an appointed board that deviates too 
far from prevailing political opinion. All the model does is furnish a city 
with a public transit advocate that is separate and distinct from those city 
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government agencies and civic groups whose advice to government is 
incompatible with the requirements for transit viability. Such advisors not 
only include the many governmental and non-governmental interests who 
promote the use of automobiles and the provision of public facilities to 
serve them but also those land use planners (both public and private) whose 
schemes cater to the automobile and ignore transit altogether. It is 
doubtful, however, that an independent commission can serve as an 
effective advocate for transit in a hostile or non-supportive environment. 
During the years under city ownership the TTC's ability to promote the 
interests of mass transit against competing pressures on government 
derived substantial support from two city council decisions taken early in 
its history: the decision not to increase the size of the city by further 
annexations and the decision to allow the TTC to retain its surplus earnings 
to sustain the system through difficult times and rehabilitate it in good 
ones. The first decision relieved the transit agency from pressures to 
provide uneconomic services to areas still undergoing development; the 
second allowed it to make a number of investments with important 
consequences for the subsequent development of the area's transit system. 
If the transit system had remained in the hands of the Department of Works 
it is likely that at least some councils would have used its surplus revenues 
to satisfy ever-recurring demands for reduced fares, street improvements 
or lower taxes. The subsequent history of the system would thus have been 
much more like that of those found in other North American cities. 
The most important decision for the development of Toronto's transit 
system under the aegis of metropolitan government was the 1946 decision 
to build a Yonge Street subway. The credit for that decision belongs almost 
entirely to the TTC, which had to overcome the scepticism of planning and 
transportation officials preoccupied with finding ways to accommodate the 
automobile as well as the reluctance of the city government to commit any 
funds to such a project. The long-run importance of the decision had little 
to do with the TTC's desire to improve service on heavily-congested streets, 
however. It derived instead from the subway's perceived role as a catalyst 
for development not only in the downtown but throughout the length of the 
corridor through which it travelled. Ironically it was the identification of 
subways with the pursuit of developmental objectives that not only 
accounted for the political support the TTC managed to win in Metro Council 
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-first from city and then from suburban members - but that ultimately 
resulted in the loss of much of its influence over the development of Metro's 
transit policy. 
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